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Introduction
In the last two decades many countries have proposed structural reforms to decentralize public
tasks as well as policy decisions to sub-central jurisdictions. The aim of these reforms, ac-
cordingly with the common theoretical arguments, was to produce beneﬁcial eﬀects such as an
improved matching between citizens' preferences and policy adoption, an increase in politicians'
accountability and a more eﬃcient selection of good oﬃcials. Interestingly, these changes have
been put in place in both developed countries (e.g., Italy and Spain) and developing countries
(e.g., Brazil and South Africa).
As a direct consequence, local authorities have assumed an important role in the policy
arena given the increased power to impact eﬀectively citizens' welfare. As additional result,
these reforms have produced in several countries a condition of partial decentralization, where
both lower and upper level jurisdictions are put in a position to aﬀect the ﬁnal policy decisions.1
These two eﬀects together draw to evaluations of policies that need to consider more carefully
the hierarchical structure of the decision-making process and highlight the existence of potential
vertical interactions between governments.
This thesis aims at giving a substantial contribution in that direction by studying some
of the economical issues that aﬀect local governments policies, taking into account the multi-
tiered decision-making system which is nowadays present in many federations and decentralized
countries.
To do so I provide in my thesis three empirical applications. The ﬁrst two chapters focus
on the eﬀect of direct democratic institutions respectively on local expenditure and expenditure
decentralization. They both can be considered part of the recently growing literature often called
second generation theory of ﬁscal federalism, where political incentives are crucial to describe
ﬁscal outcomes in federal systems (Oates, 2005). Instead, the third chapter deals with the eﬀect
of taxation on ﬁrms' location choices by emphasizing the role that reforms occurred at the state
level might have on local economies.
1Jametti, Mario and Marcelin Joanis (2009). The Rise of Partial Decentralization and Shared Responsibility
Federalism, World Report on Fiscal Federalism '09, (Núria Bosch et Albert Solé, éd.), Institut d'Economia de
Barcelona
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The results of each chapter are based on Switzerland. This country has been a longtime
federation with an outstanding variety of institutional settings which is also the reason why it
is often considered a natural laboratory for research in public ﬁnance. It is composed by three
levels of government and shows a high degree of political and ﬁscal decentralization, by leaving
a prominent autonomy on policy decision to local jurisdictions. Nevertheless, several public
policies are the results of decisions taken by more than one level of government (e.g., public
expenditure or taxation).
In the ﬁrst chapter, How to Tame Two Leviathans? Revisiting the Eﬀect of Direct Democ-
racy on Local Public Expenditure in a Federation (with Mario Jametti), I move a step forward
with respect to the recent literature on direct democratic institutions, by analyzing the impact of
referendum availability on local public expenditure taking into account the institutional setting
both at the state and local level of government. Speciﬁcally, I empirically test how the vertical
structure of direct democracy in a federal context aﬀects expenditure decisions of sub-central
governments using data from Swiss cantons and municipalities. Interestingly, most research on
the eﬀect of direct democracy in Switzerland has concentrated on cantonal (state) data. Thus,
it was not possible to address the vertical interaction between cantonal and municipal govern-
ments. By using a sample of 119 Swiss municipalities for the period 1993-2007, I show that
direct democracy, where present, reduces expenditure at one level of government, but this eﬀect
also depends on the existence of direct democracy at the other level of government involved in
the public good provision.
The second chapter, Direct Democracy, Partial Decentralization and Voter Information,
complements the ﬁrst one by looking at the eﬀect of direct legislation on expenditure decentral-
ization both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Direct democratic institutions are
expected to foster more eﬃcient policies (e.g. reduction of wasteful public expenditure) because
they strengthen citizens awareness of governments behaviour, thanks to an increased availabil-
ity of information. However, this positive eﬀect on information might be reduced in a federal
country because public goods are often provided jointly by more than one level of government.
The theoretical model predicts that direct democratic institutions should produce two opposite
eﬀects depending on whether the information shock is stronger at the local or at the state level.
I empirically test the model by providing a diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimation to a sample of
406 Swiss municipalities for the period 1990-2009 where 45 either introduced or abolished the
mandatory ﬁscal referendum on new expenditure. I verify that decentralization decreases after
the introduction of direct democracy at the local level, conﬁrming the model's predictions.
In the third chapter, Taxes and Firm's Location Decisions (with Agustin Redonda) I empir-
ically assess the eﬀect of corporate tax levels and tax progressivity on ﬁrms' mobility. I estimate
the eﬀect of both dimensions on ﬁrms' location choices in Switzerland. A low tax level and a
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higher progressivity should make a location more attractive because the former makes easier
ﬁrms' proﬁt maximization, while the latter allows the reduction of the variability of expected
proﬁts. Interestingly for my purposes, the corporate tax level is decided by both cantonal and
municipal authorities, while the progressivity of the tax schedule is generally a cantonal decision.
For this reason I follow two diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies. To address the tax level eﬀect I
use a FE-2SLS estimation where the dependent variable is the number of ﬁrms in a municipality.
Interestingly, and unlike previous studies, I ﬁnd a small but positive and statistically signiﬁcant
impact of the tax rate on the number of ﬁrms. The interpretation of this result is mainly based on
the connection between taxes and public spending. Indeed, from the point of view of a ﬁrm proﬁt
maximization might come not only by a net reduction of taxes but also from the minimization
of costs given by an eﬃcient use of public funds. Finally, I estimate the tax progressivity eﬀect
on the number of ﬁrms in a municipality through a diﬀerence in diﬀerences technique where
we take advantage of cantonal reforms of the tax schedule (i.e change from a non-ﬂat to a ﬂat
tax rate). The results conﬁrm how state reforms might impact directly local economy. Indeed,
ﬁrms prefer on average municipalities with a progressive tax schedule and ﬁrms from the riskiest
sectors are the more aﬀected by a ﬂat tax reform.
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Chapter 1
How to Tame Two Leviathans?
Revisiting the Eﬀect of Direct
Democracy on Local Public
Expenditure in a Federation
1.1 Introduction
How can one tame the Leviathan, i.e., politicians' appetite for public expenditure beyond what
is desired by citizens? One of the answers appear to be: direct democracy. A vast array of
empirical studies have shown a moderating impact of direct democratic institutions on public
expenditures.1 All of these studies are based on countries with strong sub federal autonomy.
Prominently on the list are the U.S.A. and Switzerland. Interestingly however, prior research
ignores, fully or partially, the federal setting. In other words, earlier work considers either the
eﬀect of direct democratic institutions on expenditure at one single level of government, or the
impact of upper-level democratic institutions on lower-level expenditures.2 To our knowledge,
the full federal structure and the resulting potential vertical interdependence between upper-
and lower-level democratic institutions have not been fully addressed. This despite the fact that
all empirical applications use data from federations.
In this paper we analyze the impact of direct democratic institutions on public expenditure
at the local level taking into account both the institutional setting at the state and local level of
1Among others, see Matsusaka (1995), Feld and Kirchgässner (2001b), Feld and Matsusaka (2003) and Funk
and Gathmann (2011).
2For example, how the referendum in Swiss cantons aﬀects cantonal public expenditure as in Feld and Mat-
susaka (2003) or how the initiative in the U.S. states aﬀects local expenditure as in Matsusaka (1995).
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government. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in testing whether the impact of direct democracy at
the upper level of government depends on the degree of citizen participation at the local level.
We see our paper as an important complement and extension to the literature. Feld and
Kirchgässner (2001b) ﬁnd that municipal ﬁscal referenda reduce municipal public expenditure
in Switzerland. Similarly, Matsusaka (1995) and Feld and Matsusaka (2003) show that this
result also holds when looking respectively at U.S and Swiss States. Funk and Gathmann (2011)
also ﬁnd that state ﬁscal referenda have a negative eﬀect on Swiss state-level expenditure, but
they do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact on municipal expenditures. This last result is in contrast
to Matsusaka (1995)'s previous ﬁndings suggesting a positive eﬀect of upper level government
direct democracy on local level expenditure.
We use a newly assembled dataset for Switzerland. It comprises information on public expen-
diture and institutions for 119 of the largest municipalities from 22 of the 26 cantons (states) over
the period 1993 to 2007. Switzerland presents an ideal empirical background for our focus of re-
search. First, it is a very decentralized country leaving large spending (and revenue) autonomy to
two levels of sub-federal jurisdictions. The three levels of the Swiss federation, federal, cantonal
and municipal, hold roughly equal shares of public spending, similarly for revenues. Second,
both across and within cantons, the second-tier jurisdiction, we observe important variation in
institutional settings.3 We concentrate on one particular instrument of direct democracy: the
mandatory ﬁscal referendum.
We ﬁnd in our data that taking the vertical interdependence of direct democratic institutions
into account matters. Our results suggest that cantonal ﬁscal referenda increase municipal
public expenditure for localities that do not avail of a referendum, while this expansionary eﬀect
is much reduced and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for municipalities that also have a ﬁscal
referendum. Thus, in order to precisely assess the eﬀect of direct democratic institutions on
public policy outcomes in a federation, one ought to consider the full (vertical) structure of
institutions. In other words, the Leviathan taming eﬀect of direct democratic institutions of
one level of government could potentially be annihilated by the lack thereof in another level of
government.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 1.2 summarizes the theoretical and
empirical literature in the ﬁeld while section 1.3 describes the theoretical channel of the eﬀect
of direct democracy on public expenditure and its potential vertical interaction. Section 1.4
presents the institutional setting in Switzerland, while Section 1.5 describes our dataset and the
empirical methods we apply. Section 1.6 presents our results and Section 1.7 concludes.
3The situation is similar for the initiative in the U.S.A. For example, within the 20 largest cities: New York
City has the initiative, while New York state does not; Boston does not have the initiative, while Massachusetts
does; in California the initiative exists both at the state and local level; ﬁnally, neither Indianapolis nor Indiana
have the initiative.
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1.2 Literature background
There is a continuing and growing interest in exploring the eﬀect of institutions on economic
outcomes.4 One aspect that receives particular attention is the discussion on understanding
diﬀerences in policy outcomes between representative and direct democratic systems. In both
systems the citizen delegates power to politicians through elections, while in a representative
system the citizen is involved only during elections, in a direct democratic system some political
decisions need citizen approval. These two systems should entail the same policy outcome if
the median voter theorem holds (Downs, 1957). Nevertheless, representatives' decisions can
deviate from citizens' preferences either because politicians seek to maximize their own utility
function (Tullock, 1980), or because, despite being welfare maximizers, they are not able to fully
apprehend constituents' preferences (Matsusaka, 1992).
A ﬁrst strand of theoretical literature discusses the channel through which direct democratic
institutions result in political decisions closer to citizens preferences. For example, Gerber (1996)
argues that direct democracy is an instrument that reduces the gap between citizen preferences
and politician behavior considering a spatial voting model. When initiatives can be proposed
by an interest group, the government choses a point which is closer to the one preferred by
the median voter. Instead, when there is no threat of the initiative, the government will chose
its preferred policy. Similarly, Romer and Rosenthal (1979) explore the agenda-setter model
considering a situation with referendum on expenditure. Referendum gives veto power to citizens
on representatives' decisions. The central ﬁnding is that government expenditures are usually
higher than the ones wished by the median voter and never lower. The gap between median
voter's preferences and policy outcome is reduced.
Feld and Kirchgässner (2000) describe how the referendum can positively aﬀect citizens' infor-
mation and political action. Given that with direct democracy voters can decide for themselves,
they have an incentive in gathering more information on the issue on the ballot. It also reduces
the ability of politicians to pursue their personal goals. Thanks to referendum, politicians' work
is under scrutiny, because citizens are better informed about it. Instead, Kessler (2005) comes
to a somewhat diﬀerent conclusion. Using a median-voter model focusing on the asymmetry of
information between citizens and politicians, she argues that in direct democratic legislation the
citizen does not invest in information acquisition because her vote is unlikely to be determinant.
Further, under representative democracy, the politician ﬁnds it proﬁtable to be informed because
she has discretionary power. As a result, elected representatives allow the promotion of more
eﬃcient policies with respect to the ones that would have been voted in a popular ballot.
4For example: Acemoglu et al. (2001) highlight the relevance of inherited institutions from colonial countries as
determinant of income per capita; Aghion et al. (2004) dealing speciﬁcally with the eﬀect of political institutions
ﬁnd that democracy positively aﬀects economic growth.
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Pommerehne (1978) was among the ﬁrst to empirically highlight the negative eﬀect of direct
democracy on public expenditure. He used data on Swiss municipalities in the year 1970 to
show that the availability of a referendum in a municipality reduces public service provision.
He interprets the results to highlight that in jurisdictions where decisions are taken directly by
voters the policy outcome is closer to the median voter. Hence, agency cost appear to be reduced
by citizen intervention, leading to a reduction in excessive government spending.
Matsusaka (1995), using annual data for the period 1960-1990 on U.S. states, uncovers again
a negative impact of citizen participation on expenditure. States with statutory initiative have
a signiﬁcantly lower level of expenditure compared to the states that do not. Further, he looks
at the eﬀect of upper level direct democracy on lower level expenditure, ﬁnding that local ex-
penditure is higher in initiative states. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to, at least
partially, address the vertical interdependence of democratic institutions.
Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a,b) study in detail the outcome of several forms of direct democ-
racy on public policy. Using data on 131 Swiss municipalities in the year 1990 they show that
mandatory referendum on budget deﬁcits entails a reduction in public debt, expenditure and
revenue. Moreover, using data on 26 Swiss cantons for the period 1986-1997 they ﬁnd that
expenditure and revenue are lower in cantons with a mandatory referendum on new spending
projects. They also test the eﬀect of signature requirements for initiatives, i.e., the percentage
of the population required to bring an initiative to a ballot, on expenditure, revenue, debt and
deﬁcit, ﬁnding mixed results. The signature requirement in cantons with referendum increases
spending while in canton without referendum it reduces spending and revenue. Feld and Mat-
susaka (2003) have another look at Swiss cantonal institutions, this time using data for the
period 1980-1998. They consider three variables representing direct democratic institutions: the
presence of a mandatory ﬁscal referendum, the spending threshold that triggers a referendum
and the initiative signature requirement. They ﬁnd an important negative eﬀect of referenda.
Speciﬁcally, cantons with referendum have, ceteris paribus, 19% lower expenditures compared to
cantons without referendum.
In essence, most of the theoretical and empirical results point to the fact that direct demo-
cratic participation of the citizen in the decision making process brings adopted policies closer
to the preferences of voters.5 Further, since politicians have a tendency to increase public ex-
penditure beyond what is socially optimal implies that direct democracy has the potential to be
welfare improving.
But what about a federal setting? Most of the existing literature gives insights on how
direct and representative democracy aﬀect diﬀerently the degree of decentralization. Redoano
5Direct democracy could also lead to a common pool problem leading to increased expenditure if the ﬁnancing
of public goods can be shifted to a minority of the electorate, see Asatryan et al. (2013).
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and Scharf (2004) show that representative democracy sustains centralization even when direct
democracy would not be able to support it, because regional policy preferences are too diﬀerent.
Schnellenbach et al. (2010), reach the same conclusion using a slightly diﬀerent theoretical model.
Feld et al. (2008) test the latter hypothesis by using again a dataset of Swiss cantonal insti-
tutions for the period 1980-1998. They consider centralization of expenditure, revenue and tax
revenue as dependent variables. They conﬁrm, in line with theory, the hypothesis that direct
democracy fosters decentralization.
In a more recent contribution, Funk and Gathmann (2011) revisit the previous empirical
ﬁndings, again focusing on the Swiss case. They gather information on cantonal institutions for
the period 1890-2000. The dependent variables are, alternatively, cantonal expenditure, local
expenditure and within-canton decentralization. The main independent variables are a dummy
for the mandatory budget referendum and the initiative signature requirement. They ﬁnd, in line
with theory and the other empirical studies, that referenda reduce cantonal expenditure while
the signature requirement increases it. Conversely, they highlight that direct democracy does
not aﬀect the vertical structure of government, i.e., upper level institutions do not aﬀect lower
level expenditure and decentralization, contrary to the ﬁndings of Matsusaka (1995) and Feld
et al. (2008). They suggest that these diﬀerences are mainly a result of the empirical method.
Indeed, Funk and Gathmann (2011), thanks to a long time period, can control for unobserved
heterogeneity among jurisdictions using cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. As already emphasized, none
of the studies mentioned above, although using data from countries with a federal structure,
considers the institutional setting at both the upper- and lower-level.
Vertical interactions have also been studied within the tax competition literature. Besley
and Rosen (1998) were among the ﬁrst that empirically estimated the presence of vertical tax
externalities. They analyze tax competition between state and federal government in the U.S.A.
They show that changes in excise taxes decided by federal government on goods such as gasoline
and cigarettes aﬀect positively the corresponding state taxes. Brülhart and Jametti (2006)
investigate the presence of horizontal and vertical tax externalities that arise in the context of
overlapping tax bases across levels of government in a federal system. Using a panel data set
of Swiss cantons and municipalities, they ﬁnd that vertical externalities can outweigh the more
prominently discussed horizontal ones.
1.3 Theoretical Considerations
There is little theoretical work that has explored the vertical interaction among direct democratic
institutions. What if two levels of government avail of potentially varying degrees of direct
democratic participation in public good provision? And what about the vertical interdependence
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resulting from this? We leave a full theoretical model that identiﬁes the channels that are at
work for future research.
Table 1.1: Institutional framework
(a) (b)
Jurisdiction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cantonal No Referendum No Referendum Referendum Referendum
Municipal No Referendum Referendum No Referendum Referendum
Nevertheless, given the direct eﬀect described above it is possible that the diﬀerent combi-
nations of institutional setting might matter and therefore should be accounted for empirically.
For example, consider a federation with two levels of government, say state and local, each
with the possibility for direct democratic participation of its citizens. Let us also assume that
these two levels jointly provide a public good and citizens are not able to distinguish each level
contribution.6 For example, in most of Switzerland schools are jointly managed by municipal
and cantonal authorities without a clear separation of tasks, such that citizens are not aware
of each level's responsibility. Finally, let us take seriously the common argument that direct
democracy reduces expenditure because it aﬀects the government's potential to extract rents.
This framework produces four diﬀerent cases as illustrated in Table 1.1. Previous theoretical and
empirical studies have only considered a subset of these cases, either only considering one level of
government and ignoring the other, or only considering upper-level institutions not accounting
for lower-level institutions. Our interest is in the vertical interaction of diﬀerent institutional
settings and its eﬀect on lower-level expenditure.
By our example, if the lower level does not have a referendum and the state does, citizen
control at the upper level of government could allow local authorities to extract more rents, in
place of the cantonal one, which implies higher local expenditure. However, if also the lower
level avails of direct democratic institutions this mechanism should not work because now both
governments are constrained.
If vertical interactions matter then, to understand the full eﬀect of direct democracy, one
should control for all tiers of government involved in the spending process. This is exactly
what we do. We test whether the existence of ﬁscal referendum in the state (upper level)
aﬀects local expenditure decisions and whether this eﬀect varies with local direct democratic
6Joanis (2014) uses similar assumptions by building a model of shared accountability and joint responsibility
within a federation. His main insight is that the degree of decentralization might be inﬂuenced by the relative
political strength of central versus local governments.
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participation.7 From the previous example, we would expect a positive eﬀect of state level
referenda on local expenditure. Further, our main focus, municipal expenditure should be higher
when local government does not have referendum and the state does rather than when both,
local and state, governments have referenda.
Our newly assembled database allows us to consider the full array of direct democratic instru-
ments, which is the main contribution of our paper. More speciﬁcally, all previously mentioned
studies use the state (or canton) as the unit of observation. As such, these authors are not able
to control for the institutional variation at the local level. By shifting our unit of observation to
the local governments, we can control for the diﬀerential eﬀect of state referenda depending on
the existence of local referenda.
1.4 Institutional setting in Switzerland
Switzerland is often used as a natural laboratory to test theoretical predictions of ﬁscal feder-
alism.8 The country has three levels of government: federal, cantonal and municipal, each with
wide ranging autonomy both in expenditure and revenue decisions. During the period 1990-2009
the expenditure (revenue) shares averaged 32% (31%) for federal, 41% (41%) for cantonal and
27% (28%) for local administrations. These shares are quite stable over time. At the sub-central
level each cantonal constitution deﬁnes the basic framework for public service provision. Indeed,
some services are solely provided by one level of government (cantonal or municipal), while for
a considerable range of public goods there is expenditure sharing by both levels of government.9
Finally, localities provide some services based on a cantonal mandate. Table 2.1 presents
the contribution in percent of total spending per category by each level of government. While
Defense is almost exclusively in the hand of the federal government, cantons carry the bulk of
expenditure in Health, Security and Education. Similarly, municipalities are the main actors
regarding Environment, Social Housing and Culture and Recreation.
Municipalities also have large autonomy in setting tax rates within their respective cantonal
constitutions. It should be noted that, contrary to many other federations, both sub-central
levels of government essentially share the same tax bases, i.e., municipalities' main source of
revenues are taxes on personal and corporate income and wealth.
Similarly, all three levels of government have an array of direct democratic instruments at
hand in their respective decision making process. Also in this case, there is heterogeneity among
7By referring to Table 1.1, this means that we are going to test, ﬁrst, whether municipal expenditure is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between case (a) and case (b) and, second, whether this eﬀect is diﬀerent between case (3)
and case (4).
8Among others: Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996), Brülhart and Jametti (2006) and Brülhart et al. (2012)
9Indeed, for many public service categories all three levels of government are involved to varying degrees.
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Table 1.2: Destination of public expenditure by level of government in percentage, 2009
State Cantons Municipalities Total
Administration 57% 23% 20% 100%
Defense 91% 4% 5% 100%
Security 10% 64% 26% 100%
Economy 41% 38% 21% 100%
Environment 17% 22% 61% 100%
Social housing 1% 17% 82% 100%
Health 3% 84% 13% 100%
Culture and recreation 8% 32% 60% 100%
Education 9% 60% 31% 100%
Welfare 42% 38% 20% 100%
Source: Swiss Federal Department of Finance
Table 1.3: Use of direct democratic institutions, 1990-2010
Federal Cantons Municipalities*
Initiative 76 354 187
Optional referendum 67 362 337
Mandatory referendum 45 1374 2918
Source: C2D, Micotti and Bützer (2003).
*Based on 91 municipalities for the period 1990-2000
cantons and municipalities. For larger municipalities the two main instruments are the popular
initiative and the referendum. We concentrate on the existence of mandatory ﬁscal referenda
within a jurisdiction. Note that ﬁscal referenda can be mandatory or optional.
The optional referendum is generally triggered by the collection of a certain number of sig-
natures in a given interval of time, while for the mandatory referendum there often exists a
threshold on the expenditure amount after which a referendum must be held. In Table 1.3 we
show the use of these direct democratic instruments by level of government. The municipal data
we report are from Micotti and Bützer (2003) who account for 91 municipalities for the period
1990-2000. We see that mandatory referendum is, by far, the most used in the two sub federal
jurisdictions. Similarly, Figure 1.1 illustrates the institutional variation for each canton in our
dataset. Besides the signiﬁcant variation in institutional settings across cantons, we observe a
large number of cantons (both with and without referendum) displaying institutional variation
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Ref Can - Ref Mun
Ref Can - Ref Mun / No Ref Mun
Ref Can - No Ref Mun
No Ref Can - Ref Mun
No Ref Can - Ref Mun / No Ref Mun
No Ref Can - No Ref Mun
No Data
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Ref = Referendum 
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Mun = Municipal
Figure 1.1: Variability of mandatory ﬁscal referendum in Switzerland.
within the canton.
Thus, Switzerland presents an ideal setting to empirically test our hypothesis, with important
variation at all levels of government in expenditure decisions as well as in the institutional
framework. All this in an otherwise fairly homogeneous setting of a small country.
1.5 Data and empirical model
1.5.1 Data
To test our hypothesis we assembled a database including annual observations of 119 of the largest
municipalities belonging to 22 Swiss cantons over the period 1993 to 2007. We use as dependent
variable (the log of) net municipal expenditure per capita. This value is net of transfers that
are received from other jurisdictions, i.e., we exclude both vertical and horizontal transfers. Net
ﬁgures correspond to expenditure decisions entirely under the autonomy of the municipality and
are our main focus.10
10See Buettner and Wildasin (2006) on how the municipal ﬁscal budget is aﬀected by intergovernmental trans-
fers.
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Table 1.4: Details on institutional interaction and municipal expenditure
Canton
Referendum No Referendum Diﬀerence
Municipality
Referendum 3,368 (36%) 3,307 (29%) 59
No Referendum 3,847 (8%) 3,301 (27%) 546***
Diﬀerence -479*** 6
Notes: The table shows, for each possible institutional interaction, the average value of the
net municipal expenditure per capita. It also reports the diﬀerence and the signiﬁcance of
the t-stat for equality of means. In parenthesis the share of municipalities belonging to each
case.
We obtained information on cantonal direct democratic institutions from Fischer (2009). We
consider whether the canton has a mandatory ﬁscal referendum for new spending projects or
not. Some cantons changed their legislation in the period covered by our data, but this variation
is small. In 1995, 17 cantons over 26 had mandatory ﬁscal referendum. In 2007 the number
of these cantons decreased to 16. In total 5 cantons changed at least once.11 The municipal
institutional setting is taken from a new database at the local level by Bützer (2007).12
About 65% of the municipalities in our sample have a mandatory ﬁscal referendum. This
institution is almost invariant over time for our sample period. The only change is the municipal-
ity of Volkestwil in 2002 which adopted a mandatory ﬁscal referendum. Some changes occurred
concerning the thresholds that trigger mandatory referendum. Interestingly for our identiﬁcation
strategy is that there have been no changes at the municipal level following any of the changes in
cantonal legislation. Although the number of municipalities considered is not large, our sample
allows us to consider all possible institutional interactions. As reported in Table 1.4 during the
period covered in our analysis 27% of the municipalities are without referendum in cantons with-
out referendum, while 8% are municipalities without referendum in cantons with. Municipalities
with referendum that belong to cantons without referendum are 29% of the total, while 36% of
the municipalities with referendum are in cantons also with referendum.
Table 1.4 also presents the average of local expenditures for each case in our sample. Yearly
expenditure is highest (about CHF 3,800 per capita) in municipalities without referendum located
in cantons with referendum, and lowest (CHF 3,300) for municipalities without referendum in
cantons also without referendum. Two of the four cases present diﬀerences that are statistically
11Funk and Gathmann (2011) present details of the variation for the period 1890-2000.
12Feld et al. (2011) use the same data source to revisit the analysis done by Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a).
We extend Bützer's (2007) dataset by including information on a few additional municipalities: Basel, Glarus,
Horgen, Lenzburg, Romanshorn, St. Moritz, Sursee and Zoﬁngen.
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signiﬁcant. First, in cantons availing of mandatory ﬁscal referenda, municipalities with this
instrument spend roughly 12% less than municipalities without it. Second, for municipalities
without referendum, a cantonal referendum increases local expenditure by almost 17%.
Table 1.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Municipal expenditure p/c 3375.34 1478.53 777.18 18295.57 1785
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.64 0.47 0 1 1785
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.44 0.49 0 1 1785
Population (Log) (mun) 9.77 0.67 8.51 12.79 1785
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.51 1785
Share pop < 20 (mun) 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.28 1785
Share pop > 64 (mun) 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.24 1785
Area (mun) 0.20 0.27 0.02 2.54 1785
Unemployment (mun) 4.12 2.02 0.2 12.3 1782
University (mun) 0.07 0.26 0 1 1785
Urban center dummy (mun) 0.42 0.49 0 1 1785
Federal tax on income p/c (mun) (Log) 2.13 0.50 0.57 4.70 1785
Left wing (mun) 0.26 0.17 0 0.8 1782
Ministers (mun) 7.31 3.43 3 30 1782
Parties in Gov (mun) 3.95 0.95 2 8 1782
Language (can) 0.28 0.45 0 1 1785
Left wing (can) 0.27 0.12 0 0.6 1785
Dependency ratio (can) 59.25 16.38 -170.20 73.34 1785
Population (Log) (can) 12.97 0.82 10.54 14.08 1785
To go beyond unconditional average eﬀects we supplement the institutional information with
an array of control variables covering socio-economic and political characteristics. Speciﬁcally,
we control for population to consider possible economies of scale in the provision of public goods.
We use population age shares for old and young (share pop > 64 and share pop < 20 ), to
consider diﬀerences in the demand of public goods. The share of foreigners is included for the
same reason. Municipal area proxies higher costs in provision of public services, as area is closely
related to municipal topography. Unemployment controls both for the economic environment as
well as the eﬀect on social security, thus we should expect a positive eﬀect on expenditure. The
presence of a university in a municipality should aﬀect positively the level of expenditure either
because of direct funding or because of related facilities. We also control for municipalities that
are urban centers, to consider the possible higher demand for public goods for central places.
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Given that data on income are not available by municipality we use the amount of federal tax
on income paid per capita. Again with this variable we control for the demand of public goods
and use it as a proxy for tax revenues (see below).
Further, we control for political variables. The number of ministers and the number of parties
in the government should be positively related with expenditure because of the common pool
problem (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). The share of left-wing ministers in the executive is usually
used as proxy for citizens' preferences. Left-wing parties should be more in favor of government
intervention implying a higher level of expenditure. Table 1.5 presents summary statistics of the
data and Appendix Table A.1 gives the deﬁnition and source of each variable.
1.5.2 Empirical model
The model we estimate is:
Yict = β1MunRefi + β2CanRefct + β3MunRefi ∗ CanRefct + β4Xict + tt + ict (1.1)
where i denotes the municipality, c the canton and t the year. The dependent variable Y is the
log of municipal expenditure per capita. MunRef and CanRef are dummy variables whether
a municipality or a canton avails of a mandatory ﬁscal referendum, respectively. Xict are other
control variables including the political and socio-economic ones discussed above, while tt are
year ﬁxed eﬀects. ict is the error term.
We start by estimating the model in Equation (2.9) without considering institutional inter-
action, mainly for comparison to prior studies. We then proceed to add the interaction term
to test our main hypothesis. Prior to presenting our results, discussion of a few methodological
points is in order.
Cantonal heterogeneity
Funk and Gathmann (2011) ﬁnd that cantonal unobserved heterogeneity aﬀects in an important
way the impact of direct democratic institutions on public expenditure. To control for unobserved
heterogeneity they include canton ﬁxed eﬀects.
Ideally, our estimation of Equation (2.9) would also include canton ﬁxed eﬀects. However,
as mentioned above, the institutional variability at the cantonal level is very small. As such,
the eﬀect of a mandatory cantonal referendum would only be identiﬁed by those municipalities
which belong to cantons with changes in the year of the change. In our case, this would be only
43 over a sample of 1785 observations. We thus report results using cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects as a
robustness check to our baseline results.
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However, accounting for cantonal heterogeneity is important. Therefore, we control, as an
alternative to ﬁxed eﬀects, for observable cantonal diﬀerences in most of our speciﬁcations,
i.e., we extend the set of controls Xict by canton level variables. We include a dummy for
Latin language cantons to control for cultural diﬀerences across regions. Further, we control for
political preferences using the share of seats of left wing parties in the cantonal parliament. To
take into account the demand side we include cantonal population and the dependence ratio. In
addition, we use dummy variables for the cantons of Basel-City and Geneva. Both city-cantons,
with special (cantonal) revenue sharing agreements between the city and the (much smaller)
other municipalities in the canton. Summary statistics are included in Table 1.5.
As a further robustness check, we use random eﬀects estimation. Given the structure of
the dataset we use an unbalanced, nested error component model. Our dataset is the classical
example of a hierarchical and unbalanced panel (Baltagi et al., 2001).
Endogeneity
An important issue, inherently diﬃcult to deal with when analyzing the eﬀect of institutions
on outcomes is the potential endogeneity of institutions. Indeed, unobserved characteristics
(for example ﬁscal conservatism) could determine both the choice of institutions and the level
of expenditure. As mentioned before, in our dataset we cannot control for unobserved stable
cantonal characteristics via the inclusion of canton ﬁxed eﬀects. Further, Funk and Gathmann
(2011) use institutions of neighboring jurisdictions as instruments. In our situation, this would
mean that we instrument our municipal referendum variable by a (weighted) average of insti-
tutions in neighboring jurisdictions. We cannot apply this identiﬁcation strategy, since not all
(neighboring) municipalities are contained in our sample.
We address the issue in three ways. First by including observable cantonal characteristics
(see above).13 Second, institutions are highly persistent. The introduction of ﬁscal referenda
both at cantonal and municipal levels starts in the end of the 19th century. For most of the
cantons and municipalities in the sample, the set of institutions has been in place decades before
the beginning of our sample. We thus regard institutions at least as predetermined. We would
argue that this approach of identiﬁcation is strengthened by the fact that, as mentioned above,
no municipality in our sample changed institutions following any of the (few) cantonal changes
we observe.
Finally, to acknowledge that our variation is mostly cross-sectional, we run a speciﬁcation
using municipal averages.
13Feld et al. (2008) widely argue that in Switzerland such endogeneity is a minor issue after one controls for
the main cultural diﬀerences (e.g., language and religion) between cantons.
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Inference
We use as baseline standard errors clustered by cantons, since the dependent variable is explained
by variables that are observed on a more aggregate level (Moulton, 1990).14 In our case, the
cantonal referendum and controls. Further, given the panel structure of our dataset, serial
correlation on expenditure could arise. Thus, as a robustness check we cluster the errors at the
municipal level. Finally, given that our observations are geographical units we control for spatial
correlation among municipalities by using the method proposed by Conley (1999).
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Main results
In Table 1.6 we show the results of our analysis without considering the interaction term. The
eﬀect of direct democracy on expenditure in our sample seems to be coherent with previous
ﬁndings and in contrast with others.
As the results of the cross-sectional analysis by Feld and Kirchgässner (2001b) we ﬁnd that
direct democratic institution at municipal level has a negative direct eﬀect on local expenditure.
By looking at the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1.6 this is robust to controlling for socio-economic
and political variables.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.6 we show that cantonal referendum aﬀects municipal
expenditure positively in our sample. This is coherent with the ﬁnding of Matsusaka (1995)
but in contrast with Funk and Gathmann (2011). Municipalities that belong to cantons with
mandatory referendum present an expenditure level that is around 15% higher (column 4) than
the ones belonging to cantons without referendum.
In the last two columns of Table 1.6 we include both the municipal and cantonal referendum
dummies, but without the interaction term. The results of our main variables vary only slightly
and they are both signiﬁcant.
The control variables that are always signiﬁcant are the share of young population, the mu-
nicipal area, the university dummy and the federal tax income. A younger population negatively
aﬀects municipal expenditure, while municipal area, a university and income have a positive
eﬀect.
In Table 1.7 we present our main results including the interaction term. Our model performs
quite well, in the full speciﬁcation we explain more than 50% of the variation in our data. Further,
the coeﬃcients on the controls do not diﬀer much from Table 1.6. As such we do not discuss
them further here.
14Alternatively, to take into account the limited number of clusters at hand, we used the wild-boostrap method
proposed by Miller et al. (2008). Results do not change and are available upon request.
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Table 1.6: Model without interaction term for the period 1993-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandatory ref. (mun) -0.022 -0.030 -0.065 -0.078**
(0.081) (0.037) (0.072) (0.037)
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.148** 0.172*** 0.156** 0.181***
(0.062) (0.050) (0.061) (0.051)
Population (Log) (mun) 0.010 0.008 0.010
(0.037) (0.034) (0.034)
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.459 0.131 0.088
(0.340) (0.307) (0.308)
Share pop < 20 (mun) -3.525* -4.362** -4.320**
(1.875) (1.690) (1.631)
Share pop > 64 (mun) 0.690 0.137 0.226
(1.094) (1.222) (1.144)
Area (mun) 0.141** 0.127** 0.129***
(0.052) (0.046) (0.045)
Unemployment (mun) 0.005 0.021 0.021
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
University (mun) 0.281*** 0.220** 0.212**
(0.077) (0.079) (0.081)
Urban center dummy (mun) 0.079 0.079* 0.093**
(0.049) (0.042) (0.043)
Federal tax on income p/c (mun) 0.193** 0.206** 0.202**
(0.079) (0.075) (0.074)
Left wings parties - cabinet (mun) -0.232* -0.140 -0.159
(0.117) (0.113) (0.112)
Parties in Gov (mun) -0.026 -0.024 -0.022
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Ministers (mun) 0.009 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basel and Geneva dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.100 0.486 0.138 0.531 0.141 0.534
N 1782 1780 1782 1780 1782 1780
Notes: The dependent variable is the log annual municipal per capita expenditure. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Model with interaction term for the period 1993-2007
(1) (2) (3)
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.008 -0.011 -0.007
(0.075) (0.049) (0.047)
Mandatory ref. (can) 0.278** 0.290*** 0.298***
(0.107) (0.073) (0.069)
Mandatory ref. (can)*(mun) -0.183 -0.150* -0.182**
(0.128) (0.079) (0.075)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.007 0.024
(0.036) (0.033)
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.113 0.199
(0.320) (0.275)
Share pop < 20 (mun) -3.759** -3.882**
(1.563) (1.509)
Share pop > 64 (mun) 0.360 0.508
(1.159) (1.130)
Area (mun) 0.154*** 0.135***
(0.052) (0.043)
Unemployment (mun) 0.029** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.012)
University (mun) 0.204** 0.197**
(0.088) (0.083)
Urban center dummy (mun) 0.093* 0.088*
(0.049) (0.042)
Federal tax on income p/c (mun) 0.228** 0.209***
(0.081) (0.071)
Left wings parties - cabinet (mun) -0.210*
(0.110)
Parties in Gov (mun) -0.023
(0.023)
Ministers (mun) 0.006
(0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes
Basel and Geneva dummy Yes Yes Yes
Signiﬁcance inter + (can)1 ** *** ***
Signiﬁcance inter + (mun)2 - * **
R2 0.154 0.535 0.545
N 1782 1782 1780
Notes: The dependent variable is the log annual municipal per capita expenditure.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
1 joint signiﬁcance level of cantonal referendum and interaction
2 joint signiﬁcance level of municipal referendum and interaction
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Municipal referendum has a positive sign in the ﬁrst column and negative in the last two.
However, they are not signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. Cantonal referendum is always
signiﬁcant at the 1% level with a positive sign. These results are in line with the ones without
the interaction term.
The interaction term between cantonal and municipal referendum is always negative and
statistically signiﬁcantly so in columns (2), where we add the socio-economic controls, and (3),
where we further include political variables. Thus, a municipal referendum seems to signiﬁcantly
reduce the positive eﬀect on expenditure from cantonal referendum.
More in detail, considering the last column of Table 1.7, if the municipality does not have a
referendum this eﬀect is stronger (0.298) than the case in which municipality have the referendum
(0.298-0.182=0.116). The F-statistic to test for joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients Mandatory
ref. (can) and Mandatory ref. (can)*(mun) is signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.
Our data thus conﬁrms our hypothesis that cantonal referendum aﬀects municipal policies
depending on whether it also has a referendum or not. Following our intuition, it seems that
if citizens control is at just one level of government, then the other level of government, if it
is free to choose, spends more. These higher expenditures from a political economy point of
view could represent rent seeking of politicians. Then, in order to tame the Leviathan in a
federation, it is not enough to tighten the control of citizens at just one level of government.
The only way to reduce it, seems to be by extending direct democratic instrument to both levels
of government. Our results could also explain why Funk and Gathmann (2011) did not ﬁnd
a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of cantonal referendum on municipal expenditures, as they are
unable to control for the within-canton institutional variation. Our results suggest that this
variation does indeed matter.
1.6.2 Robustness checks
In Table 1.8 we show our results after subjecting the baseline regression in column (3) of Table
1.7, which we repeat in column (1), to diﬀerent robustness checks.
First, in column (2) we present the results using only the cross-section variation in our sample
using time-averages of our data. The results remain virtually unchanged.
Second, we deal with the possible bias related with cantonal unobserved heterogeneity. In col-
umn (3) we use a random eﬀect estimation. Again, only cantonal referendum and the interaction
term are signiﬁcant.
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The eﬀect of cantonal referendum on local expenditure is now (0.109) if the municipality does
not have a referendum, and (0.109-0.103=0.006) in the case in which the municipality has the
referendum. According to this set of results, the cantonal eﬀect on local expenditure is erased
by the presence of referendum also at the municipal level. Column (4) reports the results by
using cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. The variables of interest still present the signs that we previously
found, but we lose, as expected, signiﬁcance of the interaction term. Cantonal referendum is
now signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
We control for municipal per capita income in all or our speciﬁcations. Since personal income
represents an important tax base for municipalities, this would imply that income and expendi-
ture might be jointly determined through the municipal budget constraint, and as such would
be endogenous. In column (5) we show that this does not aﬀect our main results, omitting the
income variable.
Finally, we deal with possible issues related to the error term. In column (6) we cluster
standard errors at the municipal level. By doing so we deal with possible serial correlation. As in
Table 1.7 municipal referendum is not signiﬁcant while the cantonal is. Also the interaction term
is still signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, conﬁrming our hypothesis. Column (7) presents the
results accounting for spatial correlation that could be present since the observations represent
geographical units. We show results that consider as neighbors all municipalities that are within
a distance of 15 km. The interaction term now turns out to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Overall, all our robustness checks conﬁrm our main results.
1.7 Conclusion
We revisit empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between direct democratic instruments and
public expenditure. While most of the earlier empirical research was based on data from feder-
ations, those studies did not, or only partially, address the potential vertical structure of those
instruments. In other words, prior research focused on the eﬀect of direct democracy in one level
of government on the public expenditure of that same level, or of the eﬀect of upper-level direct
democracy on lower-level expenditure. By changing the unit observation to the lower level of
government, our dataset allows to control for the existence of direct democratic instruments at
two levels of government. In particular, we can investigate whether upper-level (state) direct
democracy has a diﬀerential eﬀect on local public expenditure depending on the existence of
lower-level (local) direct participation of the citizen in policy decisions.
Using a newly assembled database of Swiss municipalities in 22 cantons (states) over the
period 1993 to 2007, we consistently ﬁnd that local expenditures increase with the presence of
mandatory ﬁscal referenda at the canton level. However, this eﬀect is signiﬁcantly reduced by the
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presence of such referenda also at the municipal level. In some speciﬁcations, the expansionary
eﬀect on expenditure of upper-level direct democracy is actually eliminated by the presence of
ﬁscal referenda at the local level.
We would argue that this novel result, while interesting in itself, has much wider relevance for
policy and empirical research. Our results show that the full variation of institutions at diﬀerent
levels of government should be considered when addressing empirically the impact of direct
democracy on policy decisions in a federation. Further, our results suggest that concentrating
on direct democratic instruments at one level of government (e.g., state) might not be enough
to bring policy decisions closer to voters preferences, as rent extraction might be increased by
another authority, unconstrained by citizen control. To eﬀectively tame the Leviathan all levels of
government involved in the public good provision should present some degree of direct democracy.
Our paper is mainly empirical. In future research we intend to investigate also on a more
theoretical level the channels through which vertical interaction between direct democratic instru-
ments at diﬀerent levels of government play out. Further, we seek to understand how variation
in institutions in a federation can aﬀect the degree of decentralization.
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1.A Appendix
Table 1.A.1: Data description
Variable Name Description Source
Municipal expenditure p/c
(Log)
Natural logarithm of expenditure net per
capita
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Mandatory ref. (mun) Dummy variable = 1, in case mandatory
referendum exist, and zero otherwise (mu-
nicipal)
Bützer (2007)
Mandatory ref. (can) Dummy variable = 1, in case mandatory
expenditure referendum exist, and zero
otherwise (cantonal)
Fischer (2009)
Mandatory ref. (mun)*(can) Mandatory ref. (mun)*Mandatory ref.
(can)
Own calculation
Population (Log) (mun) Natural logarithm of municipality popula-
tion
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Unemployment (mun) Share of unemployment people Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Share pop foreigner (mun) Share of foreigner on municipal population
in 2000
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Share pop < 20 (mun) Share of people with age < 20 on munici-
pal population in 2000
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Share pop > 64 (mun) Share of people with age > 64 on munici-
pal population in 2000
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Area (mun) Municipal surface Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
University (mun) Dummy variable = 1, in case municipality
with university, and zero otherwise
Own calculation
Urban center dummy (mun) Dummy variable = 1, in case municipality
is a urban center, and zero otherwise
Own calculation
Federal tax on income p/c
(Log) (mun)
Average municipal federal tax paid on in-
come. Linear interpolation is used for
missing years.
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Parties in Gov (mun) Number of parties in cabinet (municipal) Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Left wings (mun) Share of seat in the cabinet own by a left
party (Socialist, Green and other local left
parties)
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Ministers (mun) Number of minister in cabinet (municipal) Own calculation on the basis of data from
Statistiques des Ville Suisses
Population (Log) (can) Natural logarithm of cantonal population Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Left wings (can) Share of seat in the parliament own by a
left party (Socialist, Green and other left
parties)
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Dependency ratio (can) (Number of people aged 0-19 and those
aged 65 and over) / (Number of people
aged 20-64)
Own calculation on the basis of data from
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Language (can) Dummy variable = 1, in case the munic-
ipality belong to a non-German speaking
canton
Own calculation
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Chapter 2
Direct Democracy, Partial
Decentralization and Voter Information
2.1 Introduction
The literature emphasizes how countries allowing for direct legislation produce economic out-
comes that are diﬀerent compared to the ones of pure representative democracies.1
Few theoretical and empirical papers have assessed the eﬀect of direct democracy on the
level of decentralization. In a theoretical contribution Redoano and Scharf (2004) suggest that
direct democracy should foster a higher level of decentralization. However, empirical analysis
has produced contrasting results. On the one hand Feld et al. (2008) conﬁrm this theoretical
prediction by showing that Swiss cantons (states) with ﬁscal referenda experience a higher level
of decentralization while on the other hand Funk and Gathmann (2011), again using a sample of
Swiss cantons, conclude that direct democratic institutions produce no eﬀects on the allocation
of public expenditure between levels of government.
Although the two analyses are diﬀerent in terms of period of time considered and identiﬁcation
strategy used, they both focus on an aggregate state level measure of decentralization. This
last point constrains the analysis since variation of direct democratic institutions at the local
level cannot be taken into account. The problem with such an approach is that Swiss sub-
federal jurisdictions play a central role in determining expenditure decentralization, meaning
that their institutional settings might be important in deﬁning the dependent variable. Indeed,
Swiss municipalities experience a large autonomy in controlling availability of direct democratic
institutions as well as in tax setting and public expenditure decisions.
Therefore, in this analysis I want to identify the eﬀect of direct democracy on decentralization
1Among them: Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2013), Feld and Matsusaka (2003), Gerber (1996) and
Matsusaka (2005)
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and as a novelty from previous empirical studies I focus on local level institutions. In order to
do so I run a diﬀerence in diﬀerences analysis on a panel of 406 Swiss municipalities for a period
of 20 years. Among these municipalities, 45 either introduced or abolished one of the more
relevant direct democratic institutions in Switzerland, namely the mandatory referendum on
new expenditure. I show once again that diﬀerent decision making processes produce diﬀerent
policy outcomes. Direct democracy at the local level decreases decentralization. Further, it also
decreases the amount of transfers that a lower level jurisdiction receives from the state level.
These results are robust to a variety of controls. Most importantly, the eﬀect of mandatory
municipal referendum on decentralization is still robust after I control for possible task assignment
and direct democratic institutional changes at the cantonal level.
These results are in line with the prediction of a companion theoretical analysis. I set up a
simple theoretical model on the eﬀect of direct democracy on decentralization where, unlike Re-
doano and Scharf (2004), task assignment decisions are assumed to be exogenously determined.
I follow this strategy in order to have a model that is coherent with the actual Swiss institutional
setting. In Switzerland, as in many other countries, task assignment is deﬁned in federal and
sub-federal constitutions as well as in special laws. However, Swiss citizens are called to vote in
favour or against any change decided to existent constitutions, which means that task assign-
ment is essentially decided solely through direct legislation. In other words, task assignment in
Switzerland does not boil down to a representative versus direct democracy issue. Hence, I move
towards the eﬀect that direct democracy might have on governments' electoral incentives. To
do so, I follow Joanis (2014) where substantial attention is given to vertical interaction between
governments. Theoretically, direct democratic institutions are expected to foster more eﬃcient
policies (e.g., reduction of wasteful public expenditure) because they strengthen citizens aware-
ness of government's behaviour thanks to an increased availability of information. Thus, in this
model direct democracy is viewed as an instrument able to aﬀect positively citizens' information
about politicians. However, in a federal country this positive eﬀect might be reduced because
public goods are often provided jointly by more than one level of government which might avail
of diﬀerent degrees of citizen participation. Additionally, if these two governments share the
responsibility of public good provision they will have common electoral incentives. Given this
environment, both governments will ﬁnd it convenient to move expenditure to the government
less exposed to citizen scrutiny, eventually aﬀecting the actual level of decentralization.
As a result, direct democratic institutions should produce two opposite eﬀects depending on
whether its inﬂuence on citizens' information is stronger at the local or at the state level. Direct
democracy positively aﬀects decentralization if it is stronger at the upper level, as shown by Feld
et al. (2008), while it negatively aﬀects decentralization if it is stronger at the lower level, as I
show in this paper.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2.2 introduces to the related
literature. Section 2.3 outlines the model and the testable hypothesis. Section 2.4 provides
institutional background on Switzerland, while Section 2.5 describes the dataset and the empirical
strategy. The results along with further robustness checks are reported in Sections 2.6 and 2.7.
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
The standard approach on ﬁscal federalism is based on the inﬂuential work of Oates (1972). The
Decentralization theorem suggests that tasks should be assigned to sub-central government
when the gains from tailoring policies to local communities are higher than the losses from the
presence of inter-regional spillovers. This result is driven by the assumptions of uniform provision
across the country by central level authorities and governments that aim to maximize citizens'
welfare.
In recent years, a series of studies reformulate this conclusion by introducing a political econ-
omy perspective. This strand of the literature is also known as second generation theory of ﬁscal
federalism (Oates, 2005). Besley and Coate (2003) carried out a paper related to the one of Oates
(1972) by relaxing his basic assumptions. Government objective functions take into account po-
litical incentives and centralization does not imply uniform provision anymore. The authors
assume the provision of public goods as the outcome of a political process. When centralization
is in place the bargaining process involves delegates elected from diﬀerent jurisdictions. Hence,
a common pool problem arises producing an over provision of public goods. In contrast with
previous results, the only case in which centralization reaches eﬃciency is when there are iden-
tical regions and spillovers eﬀects are complete. Nevertheless, the author conﬁrms the intuition
of Oates that heterogeneity and spillovers are the core elements in the decentralization problem.
The second generation theory considers also the possible positive eﬀect of ﬁscal federalism on
government's accountability. One of the main arguments is the presence of yardstick competition.
Besley and Case (1995) consider a model where citizens compare own policy outcomes with
neighbouring jurisdictions. Under the assumption of similar shocks, rational voters will take into
account performance comparison while they vote. Hence, policy choices among neighbouring
jurisdictions become interdependent given the possible strategic behaviour of politicians. The
authors test the model prediction using U.S. state level data. Yardstick competition works as a
ﬁscal restraint.2
Other authors move the attention from the horizontal interactions among sub-central levels
2Bordignon et al. (2003) conﬁrm these results by looking at the presence of yardstick competition among local
governments in Italy.
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of government to the vertical interactions between central and local levels of government.
For example, Joanis (2014) produces a theoretical analysis by moving away from the classical
hypothesis of complete centralization or decentralization assuming a condition of partial decen-
tralization. In the latter more than one level of government provide a speciﬁc public good. The
model is structured on a pure moral hazard political agency model. Strategic behaviours arise
because of the asymmetric information of governments with respect to voters, that eventually
triggers a reduction on the accountability beneﬁts of decentralization. The main results predict
that decentralization crucially depends on the relative rents from holding oﬃce, besides political
conditions and competence of both levels of government. The author ﬁnally suggests that partial
decentralization is desirable only if the beneﬁt of complementarity in good provision is higher
than the cost due to the reduction in accountability.3
Therefore, it seems that there is a positive eﬀect on politicians accountability if we look at
horizontal interaction between same level jurisdictions (Besley and Case, 1995); while a negative
eﬀect might arise if we look at the jurisdictions of two or more diﬀerent levels (Joanis, 2014).4
Few theoretical and empirical studies predict how decision making process institutions (i.e.,
direct vs. representative democracy) can deﬁne the extent of ﬁscal decentralization.
Redoano and Scharf (2004) look at the centralization process of tasks. In this case the au-
thors consider centralization as equalization of policies across regions. They show that under
representative democracy, voters from a pro-centralization jurisdiction can aﬀect delegates con-
duct from a reluctant jurisdiction by choosing representatives which present similar preferences.
Thus, centralization has a higher probability to occur when the decisions are taken through
representative rather than direct democracy.
Empirical analysis have been done to test this theoretical prediction. Both Funk and Gath-
mann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008) show results by using data on Swiss cantons. The latter
conﬁrm the hypothesis that direct democracy encourages decentralization while the former did
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of direct democracy on the level of decentralization. One of the
main diﬀerences in these two studies is the identiﬁcation strategy. On the one hand, Feld et al.
(2008) consider direct democracy as a predetermined characteristic of cantons suggesting that
endogeneity is a minor issue in this analysis. Given this assumption they relay on a pooled
cross section - time series analysis where a high number of controls are used to compensate for
the absence of ﬁxed eﬀects. On the other hand, Funk and Gathmann (2011) allow the eﬀect to
be identiﬁed by those jurisdictions that experienced an institutional change over the 100 years
period they consider. To do so, they exploit a ﬁrst dimension of endogeneity by using ﬁxed
eﬀects at the cantonal level, thus controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among jurisdictions.
3Jametti and Joanis (2011, 2014) empirically conﬁrm the model predictions.
4Brulhart and Jametti (2006) show that in a context of tax competition vertical interaction between government
might be more relevant than the horizontal one.
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Further, they provide a robustness check, to control for a second type of endogeneity that stems
from the reasons leading cantons to change institutions. Hence, they use an instrumental vari-
able approach by instrumenting direct democratic institutions on the availability of the same
institution in neighbouring cantons and with the number of signatures to launch a constitutional
initiative.
In a separate paper Galletta and Jametti (2012) look at the eﬀect of state direct democracy on
local level expenditure. They have done an extension of previous works by allowing for variation
of institutions over the two levels of government involved in the public good provision. They
found that direct democracy at the state level foster an increase of local public expenditure.
However, this eﬀect is lower when also local government experience direct legislation. Thus,
vertical interaction of decision making process institutions seems to play a role.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 The economic framework
The theoretical structure draws on Joanis (2014), where vertical interaction of governments char-
acteristics have been found to present a major impact on decentralization. My framework focuses
speciﬁcally on the role played by direct democracy in determining decentralization. For this rea-
son I see my model as a simpliﬁed version of Joanis (2014) where more elements are considered
in the analysis. I emphasize the informative eﬀect that direct legislation produces on citizen
awareness of government actions and how this will eventually aﬀect the level of decentralization.
There are two time periods t = 1, 2 and two levels of government i = s, l (state and local)
that jointly provide a public good g in a given local jurisdiction where citizens have homogeneous
preferences.5 Citizens' preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear utility function.
u(g, c) = gσ + c (2.1)
where 0 < σ < 1 while g and c are the consumption of a public and a private good respectively.
The public good output is given by a CES production function in which the inputs are given
by each level of government contribution:
g = ((gs)θ + (gl)θ)
1
θ , (2.2)
where 0 < θ < 1, which implies that the inputs are not perfect substitutes. It is worth noting
that, diﬀerently from Joanis (2014), the two governments are assumed to be equally competent
in the provision of the public good.
5Given that citizens are homogeneous population is normalized to one.
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Each government levies a lump sum tax xi such that
X = xs + xl, with xi = τgi, (2.3)
is the amount that taxpayers devotes to taxes. τ is the unit cost of production, which is assumed
to be equal for both levels of government.
Finally, all citizens have an endowment of the private good, y, which is either consumed or
used to pay taxes
y = X + c. (2.4)
2.3.2 Voters, politicians and elections
Let us assume that the cost of production, τ , and the share of each government's revenue,
xi, are unknown by voters. Further, voters have imperfect information on each government's
contribution to public good provision gi and thus on the actual level of public good, g. In addi-
tion, citizens are assumed to trust incumbents' pre-electoral announcement about implemented
policies. Given the asymmetric information with respect to voters, politicians would behave
rationally by claiming a level of expenditure higher than the actual one. Therefore, voters will
systematically misconceive in excess public expenditure.
Accordingly, a crucial point in this model is played by the interrelation between the decision
making process and voters information about actions of politicians. Ability of voters in under-
standing the real eﬀort of each level is strongly related with the type of decision making process
they experience. What I assume here is that direct and representative democracy produce dif-
ferent outcomes in terms of citizens' awareness of political issues. While in the former, decisions
are taken directly by citizens or at least they are called to conﬁrm politicians' decisions, in the
latter oﬃcials act with no immediate control. Information is more easily accessible under direct
democracy because it allows both a higher level of transparency and a higher participation in the
public debates preceding policies decision.Benz and Stutzer (2007) reviews in details empirical
and theoretical ﬁndings that validate this argument.
From this basic insight, I assume that δi ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that is positively related with
the availability of direct democratic institutions in a jurisdiction. The closer δi is to 1, the greater
is the citizen's capacity to perfectly asses the level of public expenditure. Both governments know
the values of these parameters while it is unknown to citizens. Therefore, by taking into account
the eﬀect of direct democracy on information, citizens are expected to observe g˜i = (δi)−1gi from
a contribution gi.
Governments from the two levels are assumed to obtain utility from being in oﬃce. Basically,
politicians seek reelection because they receive ego-rents from holding oﬃce (e.g., the prestige
of power).
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Finally, I assume that at the end of period 1 elections take place at both levels. Voters will
choose between the incumbent and a challenger who is going to be in power in period 2. I assume
that the probability of reelection, η, is positively related to the perceived utility u˜(g˜, c) according
to a function F (u˜), where F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0 and 0 < F (u˜) < 1.6 Therefore, government will choose
gi such that it maximizes their own probability of reelection. All considered, the reelection rule
will be aﬀected by the decision making process at both levels of government eventually aﬀecting
the level of decentralization.
2.3.3 Decentralization equilibrium
I can now solve the model to derive the equilibrium level of decentralization in the ﬁrst period
of the game.
Remembering that governments have to take into account citizens assessment on each level
contribution, instead of the real eﬀort, we obtain:
max
gi
F (((gi(δi)
−1
)θ + (g−i(δ−i)−1)θ)
σ
θ + y − τ(gi + g−i)), (2.5)
From the ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization problem in (2.5) we get the two best
response functions
0 = F ′(·)
[
σ(δl)
−1
(gl(δl)
−1
)θ−1((gl(δl)−1)θ + (gs(δs)−1)θ)
σ
θ
−1 − τ
]
, (2.6)
0 = F ′(·)
[
σ(δs)−1(gs(δs)−1)θ−1((gl(δl)−1)θ + (gs(δs)−1)θ)
σ
θ
−1 − τ
]
, (2.7)
for the local and the state government respectively.
By solving equation (2.6) and (2.7) for an interior solution we ﬁnd the spending ratio value
of equilibrium :
gl
gs
=
(
δl
δs
) θ
θ−1
≈ DEC (2.8)
that is the main component in the usual deﬁnition of decentralization (i.e., g
l
gl+gs
).
By looking at Equation (2.8), and noticing that the exponent is negative, we see that the
higher (lower) the value of δl, due to the presence (absence) of direct democratic institutions
6As in Joanis (2014) one might interpret the function F as the probability that the utility experienced by
citizens is higher than a random threshold that would make citizens willing to reelect the incumbent.
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at the local level, the lower (higher) the level of decentralization. On the contrary, the higher
(lower) the value of δs the higher (lower) the level of decentralization.
How do we explain this result? Citizens vote for the incumbent when they perceive that
spending in the public goods is adequate to satisfy their preferences. However, citizens' beliefs
about public goods provision are aﬀected to a large extent on the availability of transparent
information. In the model this depends crucially on the availability of direct democracy. Thus,
each government ﬁnds it convenient to allocate expenditure to the level that has the lowest
presence of direct democratic instruments so that it can claim a higher level of expenditure (i.e.,
a higher supply of public services) during the electoral campaign. By doing so they both increase
the probability of reelection. Indeed, for a given level of expenditure g the lower is δ (i.e., absence
of direct democratic institutions) the higher is the positive eﬀect on the probability of election.7
From the previous arguments we can derive the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Introduction (or strengthening) of direct democratic institutions at the local level
should decrease decentralization, while introduction (or strengthening) of direct democratic insti-
tutions at the state level should increase decentralization.
In the following sections I test the ﬁrst part of the hypothesis by using Swiss changes to
direct democratic institutions that occurred at the local level (municipalities). The second part
has been already tested with contrasting results. Feld et al. (2008) conﬁrmed while Funk and
Gathmann (2011) rejected the hypothesis.
2.4 Swiss institutional setting
Switzerland is a federal country with three levels of government: national, cantonal and munic-
ipal. Each tier has a similar share of total expenditure and revenue. This situation has been
quite stable over time: considering the period 1990-2009 the expenditure (revenue) shares aver-
aged 32% (31%) for federal, 41% (41%) for cantonal and 27% (28%) for local administrations.
Moreover, sub-central jurisdictions experience a large autonomy in setting both expenditure and
taxation which produce a very low vertical imbalance.
Although a recent reform proposes a more clear division of tasks between cantonal and federal
levels, still many tasks are jointly carried out with contributions of all levels of government.
Nevertheless, if not explicitly deﬁned in the Swiss constitution, decisions concerned with the
actual division of tasks is mainly chosen by cantons. Table 2.1 shows the ﬁnancial eﬀort, of
cantons and municipalities, for diﬀerent categories of public services.
7In principle, complete centralization or decentralization will be the outcome with no predetermined task
assignment rules.
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Table 2.1: Destination of public expenditure by level of government in percentage, 2009
Cantons Municipalities
Administration 44% 56%
Security 71% 29%
Education 63% 37%
Culture 34% 66%
Health 87% 13%
Welfare 61% 39%
Transport 57% 43%
Environment 22% 78%
Economy 72% 28%
Total 60% 40%
Source: Swiss Federal Department of Finance
In general, both cantons and municipalities levy taxes on personal income and wealth as well
as corporate income and capital. Note that the largest contributions to the revenue come from
taxes on personal income.
Further, constitutions deﬁne the availability of direct democratic instruments. Most impor-
tantly, in all three levels a constitutional reform requires citizens approval. This is a relevant
institutional characteristic that make more reasonable in the Swiss context to move the theoret-
ical intuition away from the task assignment issue usually considered in previous studies. Once
again this means that even if the reform for a higher involvement of citizens is decided by the
government it has to be accepted by voters.
All three levels of government democratically elect executive and legislative branches.8 Fur-
ther, they provide a variety of direct democratic instruments at citizens disposal. Once again,
there is heterogeneity on the availability of these instruments depending on the canton and the
municipality considered.
Apart the communal assembly, initiative and referendum are the most common kinds of direct
democratic instruments. With initiatives citizens directly promote new laws, or the modiﬁcation
of old ones, while with referenda they conﬁrm or not a previous decision taken by the legislative
branch. Referendum might be optional or mandatory. In the ﬁrst case the referendum takes
place only after that citizens collect a certain number of signatures within a deﬁned interval of
8In many small municipalities the legislative branch is the communal assembly in which decisions are taken
directly by citizens. There are also situations in which both parliament and the assembly coexist and this is also
the case for two rural cantons Glarus and Appenzell-Innerrhoden.
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time, while in the latter all new decisions have to be conﬁrmed by popular vote.
For sub-central jurisdictions a predominant type of referendum is the mandatory ﬁscal refer-
endum on new expenditure. This kind of budget referendum makes compulsory for governments
to ask citizens the approval for speciﬁc expenditure (once or repeated) that exceed a given
threshold.
In the empirical analysis I consider mandatory ﬁscal referendum on new expenditure as the
main expression of direct democracy. Although the variety of instruments just presented, this
kind of referendum allows to highlight connections between direct democratic institutions and
citizens' information developed in the theoretical model.
2.5 Data and empirical model
2.5.1 Data 9
I assembled a panel of 406 Swiss municipalities belonging to the 26 Swiss cantons considering
yearly observations for the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009 inclusive.10
My sample is composed by those municipalities that have met the following criteria: ﬁrst,
have provided information on categorical expenditure for at least 15 years in the 20 years period
considered; second, have not experienced either a merge with other municipalities or a split,
again in the 20 years period.
Among these municipalities other two alternative criteria needed to be satisﬁed: ﬁrst, being
part of the sample already studied in Bützer (2007) which reports detailed information on direct
democratic institutions; second, to have answered and provided information for at least two years
to a survey in which we asked for laws necessary to codify direct democratic institutions.11 After
all, 54 and 352 municipalities satisﬁed respectively the ﬁrst and the second criteria.
The dependent variable, decentralization, is measured as the share of municipal per capita
public expenditure of the total municipal and cantonal per capita public expenditure.12 There-
fore, decentralization = local exp p/clocal exp p/c+state exp p/c .
It is worth noting that this is a peculiar way of computing decentralization when information
at state level expenditure are not directly imputable to a speciﬁc municipality. I basically
assume that citizens from one canton, regardless the municipality of residence, experience the
9I am thankful to Marco Tarchini for excellent assistantship in collecting information on municipal legislation.
10Switzerland had 2596 municipalities at the beginning of 2010.
11We asked 425 municipalities to provide all the diﬀerent versions of the municipal constitutions in force starting
from 1990. We received answer from 352 of them, reporting a rate of response of 83%. Further, we looked at the
cantonal constitution when a municipality speciﬁcally refers to it.
12Municipal level expenditure come from oﬃcial, but not published, data provided by the Swiss Federal De-
partment of Finance.
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same cantonal amount of public good provision. A similar assumption is implicitly underlying
Funk and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008) when considering aggregate centralization
measure as dependent variable. Indeed, they assume that each municipality in a canton has
the same level of expenditure. Clearly, for them this is a minor issue given that they focus on
cantonal level institutions.
Table 2.2: Sample details
Canton Abbreviation N. of N. of Cantonal level
municipalities
in the sample
municipal
reforms
reforms (year)
Aargau AG 28 1 Yes (2003)
Appenzell Ausserrhoden AR 17 0 No
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI 3 0 No
Basel-Landschaft BL 59 0 No
Basel-Stadt BS 2 0 No
Bern BE 34 5 Yes (1993)
Fribourg FR 1 0 No
Geneva GE 8 0 No
Glarus GL 1 0 No
Graubünden GR 19 2 No
Jura JU 2 0 No
Lucerne LU 35 2 No
Neuchâtel NE 6 0 Yes (2002)
Nidwalden NW 9 3 No
Obwalden OW 7 0 Yes (1999)
Schaﬀhausen SH 15 4 No
Schwyz SZ 3 0 No
Solothurn SO 9 2 No
St. Gallen SG 34 2 No
Thurgau TG 2 0 No
Ticino TI 2 0 No
Uri UR 14 3 No
Valais VS 7 0 Yes (1994)
Vaud VD 11 0 Yes (1999-2004)
Zug ZG 4 0 No
Zürich ZH 74 21 Yes (1999)
TOT - 406 45 7
The main explanatory variable is mandatory ref. which is equal to 1 if a municipality avails of
the mandatory referendum on new expenditure and 0 otherwise. Contrary to previous research
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable
Expenditure Decentralization p/c:
- Total 0.367 0.089 0.077 0.651 6646
- Administration 0.535 0.108 0.063 0.933 6572
- Security 0.238 0.107 0 0.833 6572
- Education 0.454 0.14 0 0.87 6572
- Culture 0.519 0.219 0 0.98 6572
- Health 0.126 0.128 0 0.948 6572
- Welfare 0.345 0.149 0 0.89 6572
- Transport 0.309 0.13 0 0.789 6572
- Environment 0.674 0.161 0 0.986 6572
- Economy 0.152 0.179 0 0.968 6572
Transfers (Log) -1.101 0.908 -5.994 1.324 4305
Share of transfers 0.099 0.081 0 1 4305
Independent variables
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.515 0.5 0 1 6646
Population (Log) (mun) 8.52 1.179 4.522 12.818 6646
Population (Log) (can) 12.722 1.093 9.516 14.117 6646
Share pop foreigner (mun) 0.165 0.094 0 0.527 6646
Share pop foreigner (can) 0.175 0.053 0.055 0.38 6646
Dependency ratio (mun) 0.63 0.083 0.375 1.002 6646
Dependency ratio (can) 0.613 0.046 0.519 0.858 6646
Left wing (mun) 0.26 0.121 0 0.896 6395
Left wing (can) 0.271 0.106 0 0.857 6409
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I found several institutional changes at the municipal level. This is due to the larger number of
small municipalities considered. Indeed changes occurred only in small municipalities, while the
largest ones seem to have a more stable institutional setting. Table 2.2 reports the numbers of
municipalities by canton and the changes in institutions that were veriﬁed during the 20 years
period considered at both municipal and cantonal level.
Reforms to fiscal referendum in the period 1990-2009:
No (control group)
Yes (treated group)
No data
Location of municipalities in the sample
25 0 25 50 75 100 km
Figure 2.1: Location of municipalities in the sample.
In the sample 45 of the 406 municipalities changed their institutions (40 introduced and 5
abolished the referendum). Figure 2.1 shows a map of the municipalities and where they are
located in Switzerland. Although not directly addressed, cantonal institutions are also taken
into account. Overall, changes in cantonal institutions occurred in 7 out of 26 cantons (Zurich,
Bern, Obwalden, Neuchatel and Valais abolished the referendum; Aargau introduced it; Vaud
introduced and remove it).
Finally, as reported in Table 2.3, I use socio-economic and political controls at both levels
of government. By controlling for Population I allow for economies of scale in the provision
of public goods and control for potential mechanical eﬀects due to the dependent variable that
report a per capita measure. Dependency ratio and share of foreigner is included to shape the
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demand of public goods. I also included the percentage of votes received by the left-wing parties
in national election as a proxy for citizens preferences.13
2.5.2 Empirical model
The model I estimate is:
Yict = αi + λt + βMunRefit + δXict + ict (2.9)
where i denotes the municipality, c the canton and t the year. The dependent variable Y is the
level of expenditure decentralization. MunRefit is a dummy variable with value 1 or 0 whether
the municipality avails of a mandatory ﬁscal referendum or not. αi are municipal ﬁxed eﬀects,
λt are year eﬀects. Xict are other control variables and ict is the error term.
By using this strategy I apply a linear regression model with a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimator where the treatment is the introduction of a ﬁscal mandatory referendum at the local
level. Thus, the sample is composed by a treated group of 45 municipalities that introduced
or abolished referendum, and a control group of 361 municipalities that do not change their
institutional setting. From the model predictions I should expect that treated municipalities
experienced a reduction in decentralization. In other words I expect a negative sign for the
estimated coeﬃcient of MunRef .
Basic analysis
The main requirement in a diﬀerence in diﬀerences analysis is the parallel trend assumption.
Given the panel structure of the dataset, I address this issue by using a variety of municipal
and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects and linear time trends. By doing so I control for both idiosyncratic
temporary shocks and diﬀerentials in macro trends.
Causality
The recognition of a clear causal eﬀect of institutions on policy outcomes has always been a
diﬃcult challenge. While the use of a diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimation helps by reducing the
omitted variable bias, other checks are needed to claim causality. Ideally an instrumental vari-
able approach would have been able to produce clear results. However, because of a lack of good
instruments, I follow an approach in the spirit of a Granger (1969) test of causality as suggested
13Other controls might be included but the data would not be appropriate for the empirical strategy because in
Switzerland much of the information on municipal features are accessible only from a ten-yearly national census.
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by Angrist and Pischke (2009).14 In this case I estimate:
Yict = αi + λt +
4∑
τ=0
β−τMunRefi,t−τ +
4∑
τ=1
β+τMunRefi,t+τ + δXict + ict (2.10)
I add to the main speciﬁcation variables that identify leads and lags of 4 years with respect to
the institutional changes. Given that just few municipalities abolished the referendum, this part
of the analysis relies to those municipalities that introduced referendum. Thus, I expect the sum
of the dummy variables that refer to periods antecedent the change to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 with a negative sign, while the ones that refer for the period after the adoption to be not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Heterogeneous eﬀects
Shared responsibility in the public good provision is a basic assumption in the theoretical model.
However, the decentralization index I am using considers expenditure from tasks that might
be accomplished by just one of the two governments. To deal with this problem I look at
decentralization of speciﬁc categories of expenditure. In principle the results should emphasize
how referendum aﬀects decentralization negatively for those categories in which the governments
share the responsibility in public provision. However, one might also expect that the eﬀect is
higher in those categories that are more important for citizens in terms of electoral decisions.
Cantonal transfers
Another concern about the dependent variable is that it allows to identify only marginally the
eﬀect of institutional changes at municipal level on cantonal expenditure. Thus, to overcome
this issue I run an additional analysis in which I use two alternative dependent variables. The
ﬁrst one is the log of per capita amount of transfers that each municipality receives from the
canton. This measure gives an idea of the overall eﬀect of a municipal referendum on the cantonal
contribution to municipalities. Share of transfers is the second variable, which represents the
amount of municipal revenue given by cantonal transfers divided by the municipal expenditure.
This variable works as a proxy of the cantonal eﬀort to ﬁnance municipal expenditure. Given the
model's intuition I expect that municipal referendum has a negative eﬀect on these measures.
14Funk and Gathmann (2011) use an instrumental strategy that relays on potential spatial correlation between
municipal institutions. They instrument direct democratic institution by considering the presence of the same
institution in neighbouring jurisdictions. I would ideally use the same approach, however my sample does not
allow me to have information on all neighbouring jurisdictions of a speciﬁc municipality. Therefore, I might
produce results that are biased given that the instrument would be based on incomplete information.
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Inference
In alI the estimations I use standard errors clustered two-ways by municipality-year to adjust
for any possible correlation in the error term due to the panel structure (Cameron et al., 2011).
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main results
Initial estimates of equation 2.9 are reported in Table 2.4. These ﬁrst results show that overall di-
rect democracy at the municipal level negatively aﬀects decentralization, conﬁrming the model's
prediction. In the ﬁrst column I report the results that include just the main independent vari-
able, a dummy for the presence of the mandatory referendum, with socio-demographic controls
and municipal as well as time ﬁxed eﬀects. The results show that decentralization decreases once
referendum is introduced, but the coeﬃcient is quite small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0. In column (2) I add municipal time trends to control for possible diﬀerent shocks or trends
at municipal level. Here, the sign is still negative but this time signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at 10%. The coeﬃcient shows that the introduction of a referendum at the lower level reduces
decentralization by 1.2 percentage-points.
In the last column, (3), the coeﬃcient of interest is again negative, but now it turns to be
signiﬁcant at the 99% level. By adding canton-year ﬁxed eﬀects I control for any change that
happened at the cantonal level over the period considered. The estimated coeﬃcient suggest a
reduction of decentralization of 1.9 percentage-points given the introduction of a referendum at
the local level. Basically, the identiﬁcation here is given by comparing municipalities that change
institutions with the ones in the same canton that do not change in a speciﬁc year. I consider
this to be the most challenging identiﬁcation strategy because it takes into account not just
the diﬀerent municipal trends but also actual changes in cantonal task assignments or cantonal
availability of direct democracy. This last consideration is of particular interest because it allows
me to go a step forward with respect to what has already been done in the literature by Funk
and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008). I estimate the eﬀect of municipal referendum on
decentralization conditional on changes at the cantonal level such that I control for any omitted
vertical eﬀects related with the dependent variable.
However, even in my analysis, I am yet not able to asses the whole impact, given the way
in which the dependent variable is computed. Indeed, this is mainly aﬀected by changes of the
municipal expenditure. So, the eﬀect of municipal mandatory referendum on cantonal expendi-
ture is not clearly identiﬁed. Nevertheless, theoretically this should make the negative eﬀect of
municipal referendum on decentralization even larger. For this reason, I present further results
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Table 2.4: Expenditure decentralization for the period 1990-2009
(1) (2) (3)
Mandatory ref. (mun) -0.001 -0.013* -0.019***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.064*** -0.178*** -0.219***
(0.022) (0.046) (0.048)
Share pop foreigner (mun) -0.057 -0.049 -0.060
(0.058) (0.083) (0.076)
Dependency ratio (mun) 0.152*** -0.081 -0.029
(0.047) (0.079) (0.070)
Left wing (mun) -0.007 0.002 0.009
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023)
Population (Log) (can) 0.119* -0.020
(0.071) (0.101)
Share pop foreigner (can) -0.184 0.297
(0.214) (0.293)
Dependency ratio (can) 0.106 -0.033
(0.078) (0.174)
Left wing (can) -0.021 -0.031
(0.037) (0.033)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend No Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes
R2 0.208 0.437 0.545
N 6395 6395 6395
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as munic-
ipal share of cantonal and municipal expenditures. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p <
0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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in section 2.6.4 to conﬁrm an eﬀect of local referendum on cantonal contribution to local good
provision.
2.6.2 Causality
Table 2.5: Expenditure decentralization for the period 1990-2009 with Leads and Lags
(1) (2) (3)
Mandatory ref. (mun)
∑4
τ=0 β−τ 0.012 -0.034 -0.076***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.026)
Mandatory ref. (mun)
∑4
τ=1 βτ 0.041* -0.001 -0.018
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.071*** -0.177*** -0.217***
(0.023) (0.047) (0.049)
Share pop foreigner (mun) -0.046 -0.027 -0.035
(0.058) (0.083) (0.076)
Dependency ratio (mun) 0.157*** -0.086 -0.027
(0.049) (0.079) (0.069)
Left wing (mun) -0.005 -0.000 0.008
(0.030) (0.023) (0.024)
Population (Log) (can) 0.117 -0.027
(0.072) (0.102)
Share pop foreigner (can) -0.171 0.305
(0.217) (0.299)
Dependency ratio (can) 0.112 -0.040
(0.079) (0.179)
Left wing (can) -0.023 -0.027
(0.038) (0.033)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend No Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes
R2 0.210 0.438 0.545
N 6308 6308 6308
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as municipal
share of cantonal and municipal expenditures. Standard errors in parenthesis. Stan-
dard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05
and ***p < 0.01.
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The estimation of Equation 2.10 is reported in Table 2.5. The ﬁrst two coeﬃcients are in order
the sum of the lag coeﬃcients and the sum of the lead coeﬃcients. The ﬁrst two columns show no
clear evidence of causality. However, the inclusion of cantonal-year ﬁxed eﬀects, shown in column
(3), suggests something important for the analysis: anticipatory eﬀects are not revealed while
post-treatment eﬀects are negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, as expected. Although this
result does not allow to get rid of the potential endogeneity issue, it emphasizes the direction
of the eﬀect, conﬁrming that the institutional variation comes before the change in the level of
decentralization.
Figure 2.2: Time relative to the introduction of mandatory municipal referendum.
To give more information, Figure 2.2 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of lags and leads and the
respective conﬁdence interval. Apart from the second year before the change, all the coeﬃcients
are negative. However just the lags are signiﬁcantly negative. Moreover, the largest jump on
decentralization appears the same year of the change. A further reduction arrives the ﬁrst year
after the change, while from the second year there is a stabilization of the negative eﬀect, which
is still in the range of 1-2%. The introduction of referendum seems to aﬀect decentralization and
it appears to be not just a temporary eﬀect related to the year of the change.
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2.6.3 Heterogeneity
Table 2.6 presents the results for 9 diﬀerent categories of expenditure. The coeﬃcient of primary
interest is negative in all the columns but statistically signiﬁcant only for the categories: Health,
Transport and Economy.15 The decrease in decentralization is around 2% for the ﬁrst two
categories while 4% for the latter.
Although this ﬁnding corroborates that there is some eﬀect in act for some jointly provided
public goods, many important categories are not aﬀected by the introduction of a ﬁscal referen-
dum. For example, education in Switzerland is one of the categories that presents the highest
level of joint provision, however the referendum coeﬃcient in the regression where education
expenditure decentralization is the dependent variable is not signiﬁcant and also very small in
size.
Thus, is not clear whether referendum aﬀects decentralization in categories for which the two
levels of government are de facto mutually responsible more than in others.
2.6.4 Cantonal transfers
As already discussed, the dependent variable I have used so far does not allow to produce a clear
connection between municipal direct democratic institutions and cantonal eﬀort. Therefore, I
examine the eﬀect of municipal ﬁscal referendum on cantonal conduct by using two dependent
variables namely transfers and share of transfers. Due to data constraints the sample takes
into accounts 372 municipalities.16 Table 2.7 shows the eﬀect of direct democracy on the two
variables using the three diﬀerent speciﬁcations already presented in the baseline estimation of
Table 2.4.
In all the three alternative models the estimated coeﬃcient for the dummy on direct democ-
racy is negative for both dependent variables.
The ﬁrst three columns show the results when transfers is used as dependent variable. Apart
from the last column, direct democracy seems to not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the amount of transfers
that a municipality receives from the cantonal government. Indeed, column (3) shows that the
introduction of direct democracy reduces by 25% the p/c amount of grants that a canton delivers
to a municipality. This eﬀect is rather strong. However, for the purpose of this study, transfers
have to be considered more in a relative dimension to municipal eﬀort rather than in their
absolute value.
Thus, the last three columns exploit the eﬀect on the share of transfers. In column (4) direct
democracy is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, in the last two columns I ﬁnd that it is
15Feld et al. (2008) found that cantonal ﬁscal referendum signiﬁcantly decrease centralization for expenditure
in health, welfare, education and the economy.
16Now, the sample has 45 treated and 327 non treated municipalities.
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Table 2.7: Cantonal grants for the period 1990-2009
Transfers Share of Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandatory ref. (mun) 0.074 -0.208 -0.252** -0.003 -0.022* -0.020*
(0.088) (0.133) (0.118) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.859** -0.896 -1.200* -0.020 0.025 0.020
(0.384) (0.701) (0.681) (0.051) (0.066) (0.064)
Share pop foreigner (mun) -0.326 2.901* 1.679 0.019 0.200 0.084
(1.232) (1.694) (1.380) (0.108) (0.210) (0.162)
Dependency ratio (mun) 3.620*** 0.979 0.291 0.270*** 0.063 -0.048
(0.699) (1.528) (1.433) (0.075) (0.159) (0.140)
Left wing (mun) -1.694*** -0.668 -1.142* -0.119 -0.115 -0.173**
(0.622) (0.640) (0.605) (0.077) (0.086) (0.075)
Population (Log) (can) -0.176 -0.589 0.071 0.055
(1.663) (2.082) (0.172) (0.241)
Share pop foreigner (can) -5.352 -0.388 -0.328 0.995
(4.515) (7.210) (0.437) (0.991)
Dependency ratio (can) 0.036 -0.578 -0.157 -0.614
(1.335) (3.725) (0.174) (0.542)
Left wing (can) 1.498* 0.446 0.120 0.123
(0.810) (0.740) (0.129) (0.124)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.052 0.309 0.510 0.056 0.317 0.533
N 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099
Notes: The dependent variable is in ﬁrst three columns transfers which is the log per capita amount of can-
tonal grant to each municipality, while in the last three columns is share of transfers which is calculated as
the municipal revenue given by cantonal transfers divided by the municipal expenditure. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p
< 0.01.
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signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence interval level. The introduction of a referendum at the local
level decreases the share of expenditure ﬁnanced through cantonal grants by 2%.
These results conﬁrm empirically that by introducing referendum at the local level there is
a direct eﬀect also on cantonal ﬁscal decisions. Interestingly, the negative coeﬃcient is coherent
with the pattern expected from the theoretical background. Policies promoted by municipalities
that introduced referendum are now more transparent for citizens. This entails that increasing
the probability of reelection is more expensive than before. Therefore, cantons rationally reduce
transfers to these municipalities, not just in absolute value but also relatively to the local public
expenditure.
2.7 Sensitivity analysis
2.7.1 Control groups
The results I have obtained so far are all based on a diﬀerence in diﬀerences analysis, which
denotes a comparison between a treated and a control group where the treatment is the intro-
duction of the ﬁscal mandatory referendum. Hence, an important feature is the selection of a
valid control group. Even though I control for several characteristics and include diﬀerent ﬁxed
eﬀects still the control group composition matters in deﬁning the eﬀect of direct democracy. Thus
in this section, as a ﬁrst robustness check, I replicate the previous analysis by using samples that
change depending on speciﬁc municipalities attributes.
Table 2.8 shows the estimations of the preferred speciﬁcation, column (3) of Table 2.4, by
including each time municipalities that have common characteristics with the treated group.
In the ﬁrst three columns I deal with the fact that the treated group is mainly composed by
small municipalities while in the control group also the largest ones are included. I reduce the
sample conditional on municipal's size: column (1) considers municipalities with a population
lower than 20,000, column (2) population lower than 10,000 and column (3) population lower
than 5,000. Again the results are all negative and signiﬁcant. The eﬀect is still similar to what
I already found of nearly -2% percentage-points.
Given that the treated group is composed by municipalities that belong to 9 of the 26 Swiss
cantons, in column (4) I show the estimation of the model by including just those cantons where
at least one municipally is considered as treated. The results conﬁrm the baseline ﬁnding. This
is true also for the estimation shown in column (5) where I exclude from the analysis all those
municipalities that belong to a latin Canton (Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel, Geneva and Jura).
Indeed, the treated group of municipalities is just from German speaking cantons.
Finally, in the last column (6), I consider observations only from the treated group. This ﬁxed
eﬀects model allows me to estimate the diﬀerence in outcome before and after the treatment.
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis - Control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandatory ref. (mun) -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.017* -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.218*** -0.212*** -0.218*** -0.220*** -0.204*** -0.120
(0.051) (0.054) (0.071) (0.050) (0.058) (0.079)
Share pop foreigner (mun) -0.078 -0.100 -0.085 -0.048 -0.039 0.128
(0.080) (0.088) (0.115) (0.082) (0.099) (0.221)
Dependency ratio (mun) -0.037 -0.033 -0.044 -0.023 0.021 -0.153
(0.071) (0.078) (0.084) (0.074) (0.094) (0.271)
Left wing (mun) 0.010 0.016 0.047 0.019 0.002 0.069
(0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.025) (0.028) (0.116)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.538 0.521 0.426 0.534 0.557 0.561
N 5863 4422 2583 5783 3897 773
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as municipal share of cantonal and municipal
expenditures. Column (1) considers municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, column (2) considers municipalities
with less than 10,000 inhabitants and column (3) considers municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants. Column (4)
includes those municipalities that belongs to cantons in which at least one municipality change institution, column
(5) includes only german speaking cantons and column (6) considers only treated municipalities. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
48
In this way I leave out potential bias driven by the control group composition, but in principle
I identify just an average treatment eﬀect on the treated. Once again the negative eﬀect of
mandatory referendum on total decentralization is conﬁrmed. Mandatory referendum decreases
decentralization by 1.8 percentage-points which is nearly the same as the main analysis.
2.7.2 Outliers
As already noticed the results of this analysis are mainly identiﬁed by 45 municipalities who
modiﬁed the provision of direct democratic instruments. Therefore, it is important to check
whether just few of these municipalities are the ones which drive the results.
In addition, a further robustness check is needed to compensate for possible mistakes in the
reported information on municipal public expenditure. More in detail, data on public expenditure
I am using are taken from a survey done by the Swiss Ministry of Finance in 2009 in which it
has been asked to a large sample of municipalities to ﬁll a form with detailed information on
their balance from 1990 to 2009 by following an updated version of the Chart of Accounts and
Functional Classiﬁcation. Potentially this update might have produced incorrect information
for some of the municipalities and thus I take seriously into account the sensitiveness of the
results to outliers. All the tests are computed considering the model of column (3) of Table 2.4.
As a ﬁrst check I follow the procedure applied by Lovenheim and Owens (2014) by running
a simple permutation test where I regress my main speciﬁcation 45 times removing each time
a treated municipality.17 Each estimation reports a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the
dummy on municipal referendum. The value range between -0.021 and -0.015.18 This test
conﬁrms that there is not a single municipality that deﬁnes the whole eﬀect.
I perform now some tests on potential joint eﬀect coming from more than one treated munici-
palities. To do so, I start by removing from the analysis those municipalities that have anomalies
in the residuals.
Figure 2.3 presents a scatter graph in which the Y axis reports the residual of the preferred
speciﬁcation by excluding the dummy variable mandatory ref., while the X axis measures the
residual from a regression in which mandatory ref. is the dependent variable and the regressors
are the same as the main speciﬁcation. This graph allows me to focus on the relationship between
decentralization and the mandatory referendum excluding the other variables. In this case I am
looking for observations that behave unusually and that might aﬀect the slope of the line rep-
resenting the coeﬃcient. I identify two municipalities with this characteristic: Wildberg (index
17Lovenheim and Owens (2014) test how public aids limitation to students convicted for drug oﬀenses aﬀect
their education achievement. Interesting for my aim, they deal with a small treated group composed by 46
students.
18Detailed results in Table 2.A.1 in the appendix.
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Table 2.9: Sensitivity analysis - Outliers
(1) (2)
Mandatory ref. (mun) -0.014*** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.006)
Population (Log) (mun) -0.229*** -0.234***
(0.048) (0.050)
Share pop foreigner (mun) -0.075 -0.078
(0.076) (0.079)
Dependency ratio (mun) -0.026 -0.017
(0.070) (0.064)
Left wing (mun) 0.011 0.011
(0.023) (0.023)
Year FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
R2 0.550 0.557
N 6358 6272
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization which is cal-
culated as municipal share of cantonal and municipal expen-
ditures. Column (1) considers all municipalities but Wildberg
(index 182) and Emmetten (index 1504) while column (2) con-
siders all municipalities but the treated ones with a studentized
residual with absolute value higher than 3 for at least one year.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two
ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and
***p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.3: Outliers - AVplot.
182) and Emmetten (index 1504). Therefore, I run again a regression of the main speciﬁcation
by excluding these two municipalities from the sample. As reported in column (1) of Table 2.9
the coeﬃcient for mandatory ref. is still negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 99%
conﬁdence interval. However, it increases from -0.019 to -0.014.
I go further with respect to the graphical analysis by removing all those municipalities that
present, at least for one year, a studentized residual with absolute value higher than 3.19 This
means that I drop 7 treated municipalities, two of them are the ones already excluded. Although
mandatory ref. coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant and with negative sign it increases a bit to -0.011 as
shown in column (2) of Table 2.9.
Summing up, these results seem to add support to the expected negative eﬀect of direct
democracy on decentralization if this is considered at the local level.
19Studentized residuals are residuals corrected for their standard errors. They can be described as the t statistic
which would have a dummy variable on whether that speciﬁc observation would be included in the regression or
not. Thus by assuming 3 as threshold I implicitly exclude those observation for which the dummy is signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level (Belsley et al., 1980).
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2.8 Conclusion
In this analysis I show that direct democracy aﬀects expenditure decentralization diﬀerently from
a pure representative democracy.
From a theoretical perspective I emphasize how direct democracy can work as an information
tool that make more transparent governments decisions and how expenditure decentralization is
aﬀected by that. When two or more levels of governments jointly provide a public good they
become mutually responsible from a citizen's point of view. Thus, politicians from diﬀerent levels
jurisdictions that aim to be reelected have similar objective function. To maximize their proba-
bilities of being in charge the next period they ﬁnd convenient to move expenditure to the level
where the control of citizens is the lowest (i.e., representative democracy) such that any false
electoral claims about the goodness of their activities is diﬃcult to be understood. Therefore,
the model predict that decentralization should increase if direct democracy is introduced at the
cantonal level and decrease if direct democracy is introduced at the local level.
I empirically test the latter point of the prediction by using a newly assembled dataset with
a sample of 406 Swiss municipalities over a period of 20 years. In this sample 45 municipalities
either introduced or abolished a mandatory referendum on new expenditure. Thanks to these
changes over time I use a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach and by controlling for a number of
ﬁxed eﬀects I conﬁrm that decentralization decreases once a municipality strengthens citizen's
participation. As enhancement from Funk and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008) I show
results that are robust to changes that might be happened at the other level of government either
in terms of task assignment or direct legislation instrument availability.
I estimate a reduction of 1.9 percentage-points of decentralization which calculated at the
mean suggests a decrease of decentralization of about 5%. To produce a more clear result, let
us assume that referendum introduction makes expenditure move from the municipal to the
cantonal, with no eﬀect on the total amount of expenditure. On average a municipality from the
sample spends per each inhabitant around 4,600 CHF and a canton 8,000 CHF. Therefore, as
pure speculative consequence the introduction of a mandatory referendum on new expenditure
would decrease the per capita local expenditure of 700 CHF with a respective increase in the
cantonal one.
Finally, direct democracy does not seem to be more eﬀective for categories of expenditure
in which more than one government is the provider, while it aﬀects negatively and signiﬁcantly
the transfers from the cantonal to the municipal level. The latter point makes even stronger the
evidence of a vertical interaction between decision making process and policies' decisions. This
implies, as a general insight, the need to carefully take into account institutional conditions that
does not refer solely to the level of observation considered.
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.A.1: Sensitivity analysis - Permutation test
Index Excluded Municipality Coeﬃcient Stand. Error Index Excluded Municipality Coeﬃcient Stand. Error
10 -0.020*** 0.005 1099 -0.018*** 0.006
23 -0.019*** 0.006 1203 -0.018*** 0.005
28 -0.019*** 0.006 1214 -0.019*** 0.005
54 -0.019*** 0.006 1219 -0.020*** 0.005
56 -0.018*** 0.006 1504 -0.016*** 0.005
81 -0.018*** 0.006 1506 -0.018*** 0.006
90 -0.018*** 0.006 1509 -0.018*** 0.006
92 -0.019*** 0.005 2473 -0.017*** 0.005
99 -0.018*** 0.006 2573 -0.018*** 0.005
112 -0.018*** 0.006 2904 -0.021*** 0.005
113 -0.018*** 0.006 2932 -0.020*** 0.006
117 -0.019*** 0.006 2964 -0.017*** 0.005
151 -0.018*** 0.006 2971 -0.020*** 0.005
153 -0.019*** 0.006 3332 -0.019*** 0.005
159 -0.019*** 0.006 3539 -0.018*** 0.006
160 -0.018*** 0.006 3721 -0.020*** 0.005
180 -0.018*** 0.006 4034 -0.017*** 0.005
182 -0.015*** 0.005
199 -0.019*** 0.006
228 -0.019*** 0.006
231 -0.018*** 0.006
551 -0.018*** 0.006
861 -0.019*** 0.006
944 -0.018*** 0.006
954 -0.019*** 0.006
957 -0.019*** 0.006
1052 -0.018*** 0.006
Notes: The table reports estimates for the dummy mandatory ref. (mun) where each time a municipality is left out from the sample. The
dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as municipal share of cantonal and municipal expenditures. The independent variable
are the same used in column (3) of Table 2.4. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Taxes and Firm's Location Decisions
3.1 Introduction
The eﬀect of ﬁscal policies on ﬁrms' location decisions has been studied in several sub-ﬁelds
of economics such as public economics, industrial organization and economic geography. Fiscal
policy is crucial for ﬁrms when decide where to settle their plants and, interestingly, there are
several channels through which its impact arises. Taxation is probably the most relevant one but,
as it has been highlighted in previous studies, the provision of public goods by local governments
has an important impact on ﬁrms' location decisions as well.1 In this paper we focus on the
impact of local taxes on ﬁrms' location choices by assessing the impact of two diﬀerent eﬀects:
the eﬀect of the corporate tax rate (tax level eﬀect) and the eﬀect of the introduction of a ﬂat
tax schedule (ﬂat-tax eﬀect).
Proﬁt taxation aﬀects the investment choices of ﬁrms in, at least, two ways: through the level
of corporate tax rates and through characteristics such as the simplicity or the progressivity of
the tax schedule in place. Previous literature has mainly been focused on the former eﬀect.
In an important contribution to this literature, Carlton (1983) assesses the impact of ﬁscal
policy on both location and employment decisions of new ﬁrms. He introduced the estimation of
corporate location choices through the conditional-logit model (which is formally derived from a
representative ﬁrm's stochastic proﬁt function) and was among the ﬁrst to study new business
location. Feld and Kirchgassner (2003) analyze the regional distribution of ﬁrms and employment
through Swiss cantons showing that corporate and personal income taxes deter ﬁrms to settle in a
canton and reduce cantonal employment. Devereux et al. (2007) and Brülhart et al. (2012) assess
the interconnections between agglomeration and the sensitivity of ﬁrms' investment decisions to
tax diﬀerentials. The former paper focuses on the impact of agglomeration economies on the
sensitivity of ﬁrms' location choices to local ﬁscal incentives, ﬁnding that the impact of these
1See for instance, Becker et al. (2012).
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incentives is more important in attracting ﬁrms to regions where the stock of existing companies
is larger. Instead, Brülhart et al. (2012) focus on the power of agglomeration forces in order to
mitigate a race-to-the-bottom tax competition. The authors test whether agglomeration partly
or fully oﬀsets ﬁrms' sensitivity to tax diﬀerentials. They use data on new ﬁrms and ﬁnd that
corporate taxes discourage ﬁrm births less in more spatially concentrated sectors. Becker et
al. (2012) assess the impact of municipal business tax rates on location decisions of foreign
multinational enterprises in Germany. The authors focus on the number of foreign multinational
ﬁrms, the level of employment and the ﬁxed assets of these ﬁrms. Their results show a negative
(and small) impact of business tax rates levied by municipalities on all the three alternative
measures mentioned before.
Strikingly, there are few empirical studies covering the impact of the tax schedule on ﬁrms'
location decisions. Cullen and Gordon (2007), its companion paper Cullen and Gordon (2006),
and Bacher and Brülhart (2013) are among the rare papers giving empirical evidence of the eﬀects
of the tax law on entrepreneurial activity.2 Cullen and Gordon (2007) use U.S. individual tax
return data and ﬁnd that taxes do matter for entrepreneurial risk taking. The authors forecast
that a reduction in corporate taxes stimulates business activity but their forecast of the impact
of a tax cut on business risk taking is more uncertain and varies by speciﬁcation, showing no
response or a small increase in entrepreneurial risk taking. In Cullen and Gordon (2006), the
authors simulate the eﬀect of a ﬂat tax reform on the amount of entrepreneurial activity. They
show that moving from a progressive to a proportional tax schedule reduces entrepreneurial risk-
taking. Finally, the closest study to ours is Bacher and Brülhart (2013). The paper explores the
implications of changes in the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the
complexity of the tax code for entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of ﬁrm births using
Swiss data. Results suggest a negative impact of average taxes and complicated tax codes on ﬁrm
birth rates. On the other hand, tax progressivity has a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm births, suggesting
the existence of an insurance eﬀect from progressive taxation that favors entrepreneurial risk
taking. Unlike Bacher and Brülhart (2013), we proxy ﬁrms' location choices by the total number
of ﬁrms in a particular municipality rather than by ﬁrm births. Moreover, there are several
methodological distinctions when assessing the eﬀect of progressivity and we do not consider the
tax complexity eﬀect. Finally, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of data. Our data set
covers a longer period (23 versus 5 years) and the number of municipalities is considerably higher
as well (around 1,700 versus 750). This might explain diﬀerences in the results concerning the
tax level eﬀect. We will come back to most of these issues in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
2It is worth noting that other studies have been carried out on the economic eﬀects of a ﬂat tax reform on
personal income taxation. For example, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009), using Russian micro-data ﬁnd a reduction
in tax evasion after the introduction of a ﬂat tax rate instead of a progressive one.
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This paper extends previous empirical research by estimating the eﬀects of both corporate
income tax rates and the introduction of a ﬂat-tax reform on ﬁrms' location decisions in Switzer-
land. Why Switzerland? The Swiss Federation is a highly decentralized country and has a par-
ticular ﬁscal system that makes this country a unique scenario to test our research hypotheses.
The eﬀective corporate tax rate in Switzerland is set by both cantonal and municipal authorities
while the progressivity of the tax schedule is only decided by cantons. To test how corporate
taxes aﬀect the location decisions of ﬁrms, we constructed a unique data set based on Swiss data
disaggregated at the local level covering more than 60% of the totality of Swiss municipalities
during the 1985-2008 period.
Interestingly, and in contrast to previous studies on this issue, our results suggest that cor-
porate tax rates have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrms' location decisions.
Indeed, we ﬁnd a small but not negligible positive eﬀect of corporate taxes on the number of
ﬁrms that decide to settle in a given city. This counter-intuitive result is a key ﬁnding and should
be analyzed in a broader context where municipalities do not only compete to attract ﬁrms by
setting tax rates but also in other dimensions such as creating business-friendly environments.
Concerning the ﬂat-tax reform, the estimates of our ﬂat-tax dummy show a negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms. On average, ﬁrms tend to prefer to settle in
municipalities located in cantons where a progressive tax schedule is applied. This result sup-
ports the existence of an insurance eﬀect from progressive corporate income taxes for risk-averse
entrepreneurs.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we present a brief description of
the ﬁscal context in Switzerland showing the features that make the Swiss Federation an almost
ideal setting to develop our study. Section 3.3 describes the data set. In section 3.4 we focus on
the tax level eﬀect by describing the empirical framework, main estimation issues and results of
our ﬁrst estimation model. Similarly, in section 3.5 the focus is on the ﬂat-tax eﬀect. Finally,
section 3.6 provides some concluding remarks.
3The insurance eﬀect we want to test for is the one deﬁned by Bacher and Brülhart (2013) and states that
tax progressivity should encourage risk-taking entrepreneurial activities. Its main intuition is as follows: keeping
the expected after-tax proﬁt constant, tax progressivity should act as an insurance device because it reduces the
variance of proﬁts more than linear taxation.
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3.2 The ﬁscal context in Switzerland4
Switzerland is a highly decentralized country composed of three levels of government. Indeed,
the Swiss Federation has a unique ﬁscal system that makes this country an outstanding scenario
to develop our study. In 1998 the federal government reformed its corporate tax schedule by
introducing several modiﬁcations. For instance, since then, capital is not taxed at the federal
level and corporate taxes shifted from a non-ﬂat to a ﬂat tax rate. The federal government
currently taxes proﬁts at a ﬂat tax rate of 8.5% and does not tax capital at all. The lower tiers
of government (cantons and municipalities) have important degrees of freedom concerning their
ﬁscal competencies. Cantons are free to tax personal income and wealth as well as corporate
proﬁts and capital. Similarly, municipal governments have an important autonomy in levying
taxes on either of these items. The total tax revenue raised is roughly equally divided among the
three levels of government. Moreover, while the federal government collects the main part of its
tax revenue from indirect taxes, the VAT and speciﬁc consumption taxes like the mineral oil tax;
cantons and municipalities strongly depend on tax revenues coming from personal and corporate
income and wealth taxes. In both cases, personal income tax accounts for the biggest portion
of total tax revenue (61% for cantons and 68% for municipalities) whereas corporate taxes on
proﬁt and capital represent 18% (16%) and wealth taxes only 8% (9%) of cantonal (municipal)
tax revenue.
In this paper we mainly focus on corporate proﬁt taxes. How are corporate taxes set in
Switzerland?5 Why is the Swiss ﬁscal system particularly adequate for our study? Let us brieﬂy
describe some interesting features of the Swiss ﬁscal system that are relevant for our paper. In
a ﬁrst stage, each canton sets a tax schedule where a basic statutory tax rate is deﬁned. This
tax schedule can only be modiﬁed by changing the cantonal tax law. Then, every year, cantonal
parliaments set a cantonal multiplier to be applied to the statutory tax rate and municipalities
(that take the cantonal tax schedule and, thus, the respective statutory tax rate as given) do
the same by setting a municipal tax multiplier on an annual basis.6 To sum up, the (simpliﬁed)
4In this section we only describe the characteristics of the Swiss ﬁscal system that are relevant for this paper.
For a more complete description see, for example, Feld and Kirchgassner (2003), Parchet (2013) and the report
edited by the Swiss Fiscal Conference, L'Imposition des Personnes Morales (2012). Moreover, this section describes
the general tax setting process representing the majority of cantons and municipalities in Switzerland. Particular
cases and exceptions are taken into account when working with the data.
5Given the scope of this paper, we mainly focus on corporate taxes but the setting processes of personal income
and corporate taxes are usually very similar.
6There cases in which other institutions such as parishes might set their own tax multipliers applying a similar
methodology but, because of data constraints, we only consider the tax multipliers set at the cantonal and
municipal levels. These are, clearly, the most important ones.
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eﬀective tax rate (ETR) for a ﬁrm settled in municipality i in canton c is as follows:
ETR =
Tic
Πˆ
(3.1)
where Tic ≡ τc × (ηc + ηic), τc is the basic statutory tax rate, ηc is the cantonal multiplier, ηic is
the multiplier applied by municipality i in canton c and Πˆ is the ﬁrm's gross proﬁt.
Unlike the shared setting process of the ETR described before, and interestingly for our
identiﬁcation strategy, the main characteristics of the tax schedule such as its progressivity
and the deductions to be applied are determined only at the cantonal level. In other words,
local jurisdictions can only inﬂuence the ETR by applying municipal multipliers but, on the
other hand, the application of a proportional or a progressive tax schedule is entirely decided
by cantonal authorities. This is crucial for our second identiﬁcation strategy where we aim at
assessing the impact of the introduction of a ﬂat-tax schedule on ﬁrms' location choices. To
do so, we take advantage of the several reforms applied by cantons that decided to switch from
a progressive to a proportional tax schedule. As we can observe from table 3.1, the number
of cantons that switched from a progressive to a ﬂat-tax schedule rose from 0 up to 14 during
the period of our sample and, interestingly, no canton switched from a ﬂat to progressive tax
schedule.
3.3 Data and descriptives7
To test how corporate taxes aﬀect the location decisions of ﬁrms, we constructed a unique data
set based on Swiss data disaggregated at the municipal level. We have data for almost 1,700
municipalities mainly coming from two diﬀerent sources. First, the multi-annual Business Census
(BC) carried out by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce is the only exhaustive census to collect data on
all private and public businesses and workplaces in Switzerland. The BC records establishments
(of which there can be several per ﬁrm) and attributes them to a NACE sector according to
their self-declared principal activity and gives information on the location and the employment
level of all Swiss ﬁrms. Second, we have assembled a municipality-level data set on local taxes
and other control variables from a variety of sources. We mainly use these data to compute
the eﬀective tax rate. It is worth mentioning that the BC had been conducted three times per
decade (i.e. in years ending with 1, 5 and 8) and took place for the last time in 2008.8 Thus,
our data set conforms a panel of almost 1,700 Swiss municipalities (accounting for roughly 60%
of the total number of local jurisdictions) and seven years (1985, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2005
and 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study using data on corporate taxes
7We are thankful to Raphaël Parchet for having provided us a lot of information and data described in this
section
8The Business Census was conducted until 2008 when it was substituted by STATNET.
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Table 3.1: Sample details
Canton Abbreviation Database N. of Flat-Tax
municipalities reform (year)
in the sample
Aargau AG No - No
Appenzell Ausserrhoden AR No - Yes (1993)
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI Yes 6 Yes (1995)
Basel-Landschaft BL No - No
Basel-Stadt BS No - No
Bern BE Yes 371 No
Fribourg FR Yes 152 No
Geneva GE Yes 45 Yes (1999)
Glarus GL No - No
Graubünden GR No - No
Jura JU Yes 60 Yes (1990)
Lucerne LU Yes 86 Yes (1991)
Neuchâtel NE No - No
Nidwalden NW No - Yes (1995)
Obwalden OW No - Yes (1995)
Schaﬀhausen SH Yes 27 Yes (2008)
Schwyz SZ Yes 30 No
Solothurn SO No - No
St. Gallen SG Yes 81 Yes (2007)
Thurgau TG Yes 80 Yes (2006)
Ticino TI Yes 134 Yes (1995)
Uri UR No - Yes (2007)
Valais VS Yes 131 No
Vaud VD Yes 317 Yes (2002)
Zug ZG No - No
Zürich ZH Yes 171 Yes (2005)
Tot - 14 1689 14
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covering such an important number of Swiss municipalities and years. Interestingly, these data
allow us to disentangle the eﬀect of taxes on ﬁrms' location decisions depending on the sector
of activity. In addition, and unlike data used by previous studies, our sample covers a 23-years
period.9 This is relevant given that ﬁrms might be more likely to react to ﬁscal policies in the
medium-term rather than immediately. Finally, the data give us enough degrees of freedom to
run diﬀerent speciﬁcations and robustness checks that are described in detail in sections 3.4.1
and 3.5.2.
Our dependent variable, the number of ﬁrms, accounts for the total number of ﬁrms at the
municipal level and ranges from a minimum of 1 ﬁrm in few small localities to a maximum of
more than 26,000 in the city of Zürich. Unlike recent papers that have focused on ﬁrm births
or entry, our dependent variable is given by the stock of ﬁrms. Let us spend a few lines on this
choice. The main argument given by studies using new ﬁrms data is that they control (although
imperfectly) for the potential simultaneity bias that might arise because of local ﬁrms inﬂuencing
the tax setting process through the tax base. In other words, entrants are supposed to be more
unlikely to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence pre-existing local tax rates. However, even if this argument
holds, we have decided to consider the stock of ﬁrms for several reasons. First of all, working
with the whole sample considerably increases our number of observations. Second, it is worth
mentioning that in Switzerland there is a large number of new ﬁrms that disappear after the
ﬁrst years of activity. The magnitude of this share goes from 20% after the ﬁrst year of activity
to 50% after ﬁve years of activity, might be an issue in order to identify the medium and long-
term impacts of the ﬁscal policy.10 Finally, the fact of new ﬁrms being less likely to inﬂuence
pre-existing local tax rate does not necessarily hold for small municipalities where the presence
of one big ﬁrm might make a diﬀerence in terms of economic activity. Indeed, the municipal
policy maker of such a jurisdiction might have strong incentives to modify the local tax rate in
order to attract an important ﬁrm to her municipality. One could think that incentives behind
such a strategic choice might be stronger than those present when considering the pre-deﬁned
tax base (i.e., the stock of ﬁrms). To say it diﬀerently, companies that are already set in a
given municipality might have to incur in important ﬁxed costs in order to react to marginal tax
changes and move from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, the elasticity of a ﬁrm that has to
decide where to settle might be higher to the one of a ﬁrm that has to decide whether to move to
another jurisdiction or not. Hence, following standard taxation theory, new ﬁrms might actually
have a relatively more important impact on local tax setters than the ﬁrms that are already part
of the local tax base.
9Bacher and Brülhart (2013), for instance, observe their explanatory variables for only 5 years (2001 and 2005).
10For more details check the Taux de survie des nouvelles entreprises published on the Federal Statistical Oﬃce's
website: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/06/02/blank/key/02/ueberlebensraten.html
(last access July 30, 2014).
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Our main explanatory variable, corporate tax rate, accounts for the ETR computed as in
Equation 3.1. To construct this variable we follow Brülhart et al. (2012) in order to compute the
tax rate by considering a ﬁrm with a median-capital and proﬁtability according to the distribution
of all Swiss ﬁrms. Like our dependent variable, corporate tax rate presents important variation
in both time and the cross-sectional dimensions as shown in Figure 3.1.11 It ranges from a
minimum of 3.26% to a maximum of 30.67% roughly ten times higher.12
We have gathered data on corporate tax rates by asking for the cantonal and municipal
multipliers directly to cantonal authorities. Where we did not received answer or where the data
was not available for the period we are working with, we exploited the fact of many municipalities
applying the same multiplier for both personal and corporate incomes because a cantonal law
constrains them to do so. In these cases, we replicate the corporate income multiplier by the
personal income one for which we have data for the totality of Swiss municipalities from 1980
to 2011 (Parchet, 2013). In addition, for the cases where there is no formal law constraining
municipal tax authorities to set a unique multiplier, we computed (by canton) the correlation
of both municipal multipliers based on yearly data coming from a sub-sample of more than 600
municipalities (representing roughly 25% of all Swiss municipalities) for the period 2001-2011
for which we have data on both tax instruments. In these cases, and in order to minimize
the potential bias coming from errors in the data, we decided to keep in our sample only the
cantons where this correlation was higher than 95%. For these cantons, again, we used the
personal income multiplier. To sum up, we only consider for our study municipalities located
in cantons where i) we have the real data on the local corporate income multipliers or ii) the
tax multipliers for personal and corporate incomes are the same (either by cantonal law or by a
non-written agreement or tradition showing a correlation of 95% or higher in our sub-sample).
After this procedure, we end up with a sample of 1, 689 municipalities which accounts for around
60% of total Swiss local jurisdictions and 70% of all ﬁrms. More precisely, our ﬁnal sample
is composed of the following 14 cantons: Zürich, Bern, Lucerne, Appenzell Inn., St. Gallen,
Vaud, Valais, Jura, Schwyz, Fribourg, Schaﬀhausen, Thurgau, Ticino and Geneva.13 Finally, the
following 12 cantons were not included in our sample either because we did not get any data or
because the correlation among the multipliers was lower than 95%: Uri, Obwalden, Nidwalden,
Glarus, Zug, Solothurn, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Appenzell Aus., Graubünden, Aargau
and Neuchâtel.14
11In the presence of two or more municipalities merging, the corporate tax rate is computed by taking the
average value of previous jurisdictions' corporate tax rates.
12It is worth recalling that these values does not include federal taxation.
13The ﬁrst 8 cantons impose (by law) that personal income and corporate multipliers are the same. The latter
6 ones, were included because of high correlation between both tax instruments in our sub sample.
14We are currently waiting for some cantonal authorities to send us the requested data. Hence, in near future,
we expect to extend our sample by including, at least, some of the 12 cantons left out.
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ETR 2008 - ETR 1985
-12.8936 - -11.8659
-11.8659 - -8.7933
-8.7933 - -6.2022
-6.2022 - -5.0604
-5.0604 - -3.4410
-3.4410 - -0.9780
-0.9780 - 1.5103
1.5103 - 2.9607
2.9607 - 4.6139
4.6139 - 9.8629
Variation Effective Tax Rate 1985 - 2008
Effective Tax Rate (mun + can)
0.0000 - 13.9215
13.9215 - 14.8633
14.8633 - 15.9126
15.9126 - 17.0731
17.0731 - 18.6948
18.6948 - 19.4654
19.4654 - 21.1699
21.1699 - 23.3215
23.3215 - 25.2332
Effective Tax Rate 1985
Effective Tax Rate (mun + can)
0.0000 - 8.1135
8.1135 - 10.3369
10.3369 - 11.9170
11.9170 - 13.8086
13.8086 - 15.9905
15.9905 - 17.6366
17.6366 - 19.0025
19.0025 - 20.2589
20.2589 - 21.8375
Effective Tax Rate 2008
Figure 3.1: Eﬀective corporate tax rate variation within and between municipalities
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Finally, our sample includes 9 cantons that switched from a progressive to a ﬂat-tax schedule:
Lucerne, Jura, Appenzell Inn., Ticino, Geneva, Zürich, Vaud, Schaﬀhausen and St. Galletn, and
5 cantons that did not switched: Bern, Valais, Schwyz, Fribourg, Thurgau.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable
Number of ﬁrms 156.08 777.26 1 26172 11648
Number of ﬁrms with one employe 40.16 204.75 1 7602 11450
Number of ﬁrms with more than one employees 117.29 577.73 1 19816 11579
Number of private ﬁrms 142.09 723.7065 1 24756 11626
Number of public ﬁrms 14.74 57.56 1 2019 11267
Number of ﬁrms low risk sectors 62.97453 252.5668 1 8821 11544
Number of ﬁrms high risk sectors 92.87773 517.9462 1 18143 11540
Independent variables
Corporate tax rate 15.065 3.866 3.265 30.667 11648
Flat tax dummy 0.244 0.43 0 1 11648
% Inactive and unemployed 2.338 1.988 0 28.947 11648
Population (in 1.000) 3.06 11.495 0.021 382.577 11648
% Young (≤ 15) 19.742 3.718 0 43.636 11648
% Old (≥ 65) 14.191 4.556 2.446 57.447 11648
% Foreigners 10.844 8.811 0 53.569 11648
% German speaking population 52.934 43.005 0 100 11648
% Left votes in national ballots 18.591 9.596 0 70.100 11648
Personal income tax rate 26.339 3.207 6.351 43.171 11648
% Protestant population 42.746 29.982 0 100 11648
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics. Other than our dependent variable and main regressor
described before, we use a set of variables that are included as control in addition to municipal
ﬁxed eﬀects. Those variables take into account demographic and political characteristics as well
as personal income tax rates at the municipal level. It is worth mentioning that we assume
municipal ﬁxed eﬀects to be a good proxy to control for local public expenditure. This strong
assumption comes from the evidence of a small variation of municipal expenditure over time.
Indeed, from the year 1990 to 2011 the aggregate local expenditure has increased on average
in real terms by roughly 0.4% a year. Moreover, the direct inclusion of public expenditure in
this analysis would have had two main constraints. First of all data availability. Disaggregated
data at the municipal level going back in time to the 1980s is unfortunately not available in
Switzerland. Second, even if we had data we would have faced a clear problem of endogeneity
which is diﬃcult to overcome. Public expenditure would present endogeneity concerns with
respect to our dependet variable, number of ﬁrm, and our main regressor, corporate tax rate.
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3.4 Tax level eﬀect
3.4.1 Empirical model
To test the corporate tax level eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms in a given municipality, we estimate
the following model:
Yict = β1Tict + β2Xict + δi + γt + ict (3.2)
where i denotes the municipality, c the canton and t the year. The dependent variable Yict ac-
counts for the number of ﬁrms. Tict is our main explanatory variable and denotes the (simpliﬁed)
eﬀective corporate tax rate paid by a ﬁrm located in municipality i, canton c and year t. Xict is
the set of control variables previously described. δi and γt are, respectively, municipal and year
ﬁxed eﬀects and, ﬁnally, ict is the error term.
Endogeneity
A common issue concerning empirical taxation studies is potential endogeneity. More speciﬁcally,
in our setting, endogeneity could arise from two diﬀerent sources: omitted variable and reverse
causality biases. As mentioned in section 3.3, this is ordinary in taxation studies and we are
aware that fully eliminating of endogeneity in these kind of settings is a very hard task. We
nevertheless aim at considerably reducing endogeneity by estimating a ﬁxed eﬀects two-stage
least squares model.
On the one hand, by including municipal ﬁxed eﬀects we reduce the omitted variable bias by
allowing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the consolidated tax rate.
On the other hand, we deal with the reverse causality issue by using an instrumental variable
(IV) strategy. As Chirinko and Wilsom (2010), we exploit a political instrument in a spatial
setting. We instrument the corporate tax rate of a given municipality with the average vote
share obtained by left-wing parties in federal elections in neighbour municipalities within a ray
of 15 kilometers.
This strategy satisﬁes the two conditions needed to have a valid instrument: i) it is relevant
because voter's preferences of neighboring jurisdictions aﬀect taxes in these jurisdictions in the
same way that voter's preferences in municipality i aﬀect its own taxation decisions, and ii) it is
exogenous because voter's preferences of neighbor jurisdictions are unrelated to policy decisions
in municipality i. By considering federal elections instead of local ones we rule out potential
concerns on the exogeneity of the instrument coming from the presence of yardstick competition.
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Dependent variable
We use as a dependent variable a measure that aggregates together all Swiss ﬁrms. However,
one might expect heterogeneous eﬀect of corporate taxes on diﬀerent kind of ﬁrms. Hence, as
a robustness check we replicate our baseline estimation by using alternative deﬁnitions of our
dependent variable.
A ﬁrst concern arises from considering jointly ﬁrms with one and more than one employee.
We actually expect the latter kind of ﬁrms to be more aﬀected by corporate taxation in their
location decisions. Indeed, uni-personal ﬁrms might be more aﬀected by personal income taxation
or could even reveal a very low reaction to taxes if their economic activities are focused on a
local market (e.g. plumbers or painters).15 Therefore, we estimate the model, separately, by
using ﬁrms with just one and more than one employee.
In addition, we also consider separately private and public ﬁrms. While private ﬁrms can
be seen as simple proﬁt maximizers, public ﬁrms might consider other aspects that inﬂuence
their activities and location decisions. On the one hand, public ﬁrms could be created to satisfy
a public need and proﬁt maximization would not exactly represent their aim. On the other
hand, one could expect political representatives to be the main driving force to decide where to
locate such a ﬁrm. Under both scenarios we would expect a reduced sensitivity of public ﬁrms
to corporate taxes.
Inference
Our estimations report standard errors clustered at the municipal level in order to account for
potential serial correlation inherent to the panel structure of the dataset. One might expect that
clustering the errors at the cantonal level would be a good alternative given that a relevant part
of the eﬀective taxation is decided by cantons (Moulton, 1990). However, such a strategy would
leave us with only 14 clusters which, as Cameron et al. (2011) suggest, might produce a bias
even stronger than clustering at the observation level. In addition, clustering at the cantonal
level will add noise because our instrumental strategy is based on a variable that is not bounded
at the cantonal level. Nevertheless, we introduce in several speciﬁcations canton speciﬁc time
trends in order to partially control for changes that occurred at the cantonal level.
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Table 3.3: The eﬀect of tax rates on the number of ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate tax rate 0.044** 0.009 0.017** -0.104** 0.052* 0.073**
(0.021) (0.006) (0.008) (0.047) (0.030) (0.034)
Corporate tax rate2 0.002** -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Inactive and unemployed -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Population in 1,000 0.035** 0.035**
(0.015) (0.015)
% Young (≤ 15) -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
% Old (≥ 65) -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
% Foreigners -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
% German speaking population -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
% Left votes in national ballots 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
Personal income tax rate -0.003 -0.009
(0.004) (0.006)
% Protestant population -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
RMSE 0.208 0.182 0.182 0.232 0.184 0.187
Weak instrument test (F- stat) 16.568 170.393 143.287 7.151 48.878 36.640
N. Observations 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646
N. Municipalities 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent
variable is Log( total number of ﬁrms). Corporate tax rate is instrumented by the average values of the % of left votes on
national election for all municipalities within a radius of 15 km of a given municipality.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p <
0.01.
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3.4.2 Results
Baseline results
In Table 3.3 we report 6 diﬀerent speciﬁcations where corporate tax rate is instrumented as
explained in section 3.4.1 and the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of ﬁrms. The
instrument is statistically valid for all the speciﬁcations.16 Hence, the estimated β1 represents the
semi-elasticity of number of ﬁrms with respect to the corporate tax rate. In column (1) we include
only corporate tax rate and both municipal and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In column (2) we add a canton
speciﬁc time trend whereas in column (3) we also control for other municipal characteristics by
including our set of controls. All these columns show a positive coeﬃcient for the variable of
interest but only the estimates in columns (1) and (3) are statistically signiﬁcant. Looking at
column (3), our estimate suggests that a one percentage-point increase in the eﬀective corporate
tax rate raises the number of ﬁrms by 1.7%. Evaluated at the mean, this would imply an increase
of 2.5 ﬁrms. Although quite small in size, this result contrasts the common wisdom suggesting
that an increase in the level of taxation should negatively aﬀect municipal attractiveness for
ﬁrms.17
We are aware of the controversy of our previous result. Thus, in order to test for a potential
non linear relationship, in the last three columns (4-6) we replicate the previous speciﬁcations
by adding the corporate tax rate squared. Despite column (4) where corporate tax rate has a
negative sign, the other two columns in which more controls are considered conﬁrm a positive
sign for taxation. Interestingly, in column (6) the coeﬃcient of corporate tax rate squared is
signiﬁcant and negative. This ﬁnding emphasizes that the positive eﬀect of taxation is actually
decreasing. However, we still ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact of the tax rate
on the number of ﬁrms. Again, the eﬀect is rather small. Indeed, a 1 percentage-point increase
in the eﬀective corporate tax rate (evaluated at the sample mean) will produce an increase in
the number of ﬁrms in a given municipality of around 4%. Therefore, by taking seriously our
estimation, a municipality will stop attracting new ﬁrms by rising taxation over 28.3%.
Our interpretation of this result is mainly based on the interconnections of taxes and public
spending. One would expect taxes to be a way of getting access to public goods. As it is well
known, Switzerland is a country with sound political and economic contexts where, for instance,
15For example, Gordon and Slemrod (2000), by looking at U.S. empirically show the presence of income shifting
between personal and corporate tax bases.
16The reported weak instrument test refers to the one proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006). All ﬁrst stage
regressions are reported in the Appendix.
17It is worth noting that we are not the ﬁrst to ﬁnd this counter intuitive result: for example Duranton et
al. (2011) found a positive eﬀect of local taxation on new ﬁrms (although signiﬁcant only for some of their
speciﬁcations) by looking at a sub-sample of English municipalities.
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Table 3.4: The eﬀect of tax rates on the number of ﬁrms (private vs. public- one vs. more than
one employees)
Baseline One employe More employees Public ﬁrms Private ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corporate tax rate 0.073** 0.003 0.096** -0.013 0.080**
(0.034) (0.062) (0.037) (0.043) (0.036)
Corporate tax rate2 -0.001* 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Inactive and unemployed -0.002 0.010** -0.004 0.009** -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Population in 1,000 0.035** 0.050** 0.028** 0.036** 0.028**
(0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
% Young (≤ 15) -0.000 -0.005* 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Old (≥ 65) -0.001 0.006* -0.004* 0.005** -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
% Foreigners -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% German speaking population -0.005** -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Left votes in national ballots 0.001* 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Personal income tax rate -0.009 -0.001 -0.010 0.006 -0.012*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
% Protestant population -0.004** -0.006** -0.003** -0.001 -0.004**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RMSE 0.187 0.336 0.202 0.227 0.207
Weak instrument test (F- stat) 36.640 39.242 36.008 37.168 36.665
N. Observations 11646 11443 11575 11250 11624
N. Municipalities 1689 1682 1687 1658 1688
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is:
in column (1) Log( total number of ﬁrms), in column (2) Log( total number of ﬁrms with one employe), in column (3) Log( total number
of ﬁrms with more than one employees), (4) Log( total number of public ﬁrms) and in column (5) Log( total number of private ﬁrms).
Corporate tax rate is instrumented by the average values of the % of left votes on national election for all municipalities within a radius of
15 km of a given municipality. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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the levels of corruption are very low.18 These are key features for the intuition behind our
interpretation of the results. In such a particular context, citizens and ﬁrms would expect the
local government to spend each marginal Swiss franc collected by the tax administration in an
eﬃcient way. Therefore, we might think that the negative eﬀect of higher-taxation on ﬁrms'
proﬁts could be oﬀset by a second-order eﬀect on costs, for instance, through a better provision
of infrastructure or human capital.
Robustness checks
In Table 3.4 we replicate our model estimation, by allowing for diﬀerent dependent variable
deﬁnitions. In column (1) we show our preferred estimation (column (6), Table 3.3). In columns
(2) and (3), we split the sample and consider, separately, ﬁrms with only one employee (column
(2)) and ﬁrms with more than one employee (column (3)). As we expected corporate tax rate is
signiﬁcant only when we consider ﬁrms with more than one employee. Moreover, we conﬁrm the
positive eﬀect of taxes found in the baseline regression as well as the validity of our instrument.
We ﬁnd a similar result when distinguishing between public and private ﬁrms (columns (4)
and (5), respectively). Public ﬁrms seem to be not aﬀected by taxation in their location decisions.
Private ﬁrm instead are positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected by taxation.
3.5 Flat-tax eﬀect
3.5.1 Theoretical intuition
As mentioned before, the introduction of a ﬂat-tax reform has, at least, two diﬀerent eﬀects
on ﬁrms' location choices: a positive impact given by the simplicity of the tax schedule and
a negative one given by a reduction in the progressivity of the tax system i.e., the insurance
eﬀect.19
Given that the eﬀect of tax progressivity on ﬁrms' location choices is not as straightforward
as the impact given through the simplicity of the tax law, let us highlight the basic theoretical
intuitions through a simple numerical example.20
Let's assume a risk averse ﬁrm that, with equal probability, could make either a 50, 000
CHF proﬁt (bad outcome) or a 150, 000 CHF proﬁt (good outcome) in time t+ 1. Further, let's
18The corruption perception index (2013), from transparency international, shows that Switzerland is among
the least 10 corrupted countries in the world.
19It is worth mentioning that, in our sample, none of the switcher cantons apply tax exemptions. Thus, by
introducing a ﬂat-tax reform, they automatically incur in a reduction in the progressivity of the applied tax
schedule.
20This can be seen as numerical application of the theoretical framework described by Bacher and Brülhart
(2013).
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assume that in time t, the entrepreneur chooses to settle the headquarter of her ﬁrm either in
jurisdiction i or j which only diﬀer in their tax schedules: the former applies a proportional or ﬂat
tax schedule while the latter applies a progressive one. Indeed, while jurisdiction i implements a
20% ﬂat tax rate, jurisdiction j applies a progressive tax schedule with two tax brackets: a 12%
tax rate that applies to proﬁts up to 50, 000 CHF and a 34% tax rate rate that applies to proﬁts
above 50, 000 CHF. Thus, if the ﬁrm decided to locate in municipality i, it would make an after-
tax proﬁt of 40, 000 CHF under the bad scenario or a 120, 000 CHF proﬁt if the good outcome
happened. Therefore, the expected tax payments would equal 20, 000 CHF and the expected net
proﬁts would be 80, 000 CHF. Similarly, if the ﬁrm located in jurisdiction j, its after-tax proﬁt
would be 44, 000 CHF under the bad scenario and 116, 000 CHF under the good one. Note that,
both the expected tax payments and net proﬁts are the same as those in jurisdiction i i.e., 20, 000
CHF and 80, 000 CHF, respectively. However the expected proﬁt variability decreases if the ﬁrm
decided to settle in jurisdiction j. Given the risk aversion assumption, the ﬁrm will prefer to
locate in jurisdiction j where a progressive tax schedule is applied because the aforementioned
insurance eﬀect of such a schedule reduces the uncertainty on future proﬁt realizations. In other
words, along with a reduction of the complexity of the tax system, a ﬂat tax will produce a
strong reduction in the level of progressivity and thus, one would expect that the introduction
of a ﬂat-tax schedule would negatively aﬀect the attractiveness of a municipality for ﬁrms unless
the positive eﬀect given by a simpler tax system more than oﬀsets the negative impact of the
insurance eﬀect.
3.5.2 Empirical model
To estimate the eﬀect of a ﬂat tax on the number of ﬁrms we estimate the following equation:
Yict = β1FTct + β2Xict + δi + γt + ict (3.3)
where, again, i denotes the municipality, c the canton and t the year. The dependent variable
is the same as in the previous model. FTct is a dummy taking the value of 1 for municipalities
located in cantons where a ﬂat tax schedule is applied and 0 otherwise. Xict is the set of controls
described before that now also includes the eﬀective tax rate, Tict. As in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation,
δi and γt are the municipal and year ﬁxed eﬀects and ict is the error term.
It is worth noting that despite Equations (3.2) and (3.3) rely on a similar speciﬁcation, they
actually produce results that are diﬀerently identiﬁed. Indeed, equation (3.3) identiﬁes the eﬀect
of the introduction of a ﬂat-tax trough the municipalities that belong to those cantons that had
switched from a progressive to a ﬂat tax schedule.
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Ideally, we would have used as dependent variable the number of ﬁrms aggregated at the
cantonal level. However, we decided to stick to the stock of ﬁrms at the municipal level for
two reasons. First, given that we are using 14 cantons, the number of observations would have
been too small to precisely estimate our model. Second, and most importantly, an essential
control variable in this model is the ETR which, as already emphasized, is crucially dependent
on municipal decisions.
Endogeneity
Our main regressor, the ﬂat-tax dummy, does not present major problems of endogeneity. As a
cantonal choice is unlikely to be related to the municipal stock of ﬁrms, the introduction of a
ﬂat-tax reform aﬀects exogenously both the municipal tax setting and ﬁrms' location decisions.
Nevertheless, the arguments discussed in section 3.4.1 concerning the endogeneity of the tax
level eﬀect are still valid when estimating this model. Therefore, we use the same instrumental
variable strategy to control for it.
Sector Riskiness
Our baseline estimation allows us to verify the average eﬀect of the introduction of a ﬂat-tax
reform. However, theoretically one might also expect certain sectoral heterogeneity i.e., the
mentioned eﬀect could also depend on the sector's proﬁt variability. Firms belonging to sectors
with high proﬁt variability should be attracted more by jurisdictions with a progressive taxation
than ﬁrms with a lower proﬁt variability. Therefore, as a robustness check we estimate diﬀerent
versions of the model where we consider, alternatively, low and high-risk sectors to see whether
results diﬀer and thus are in line with our expectations.
Unfortunately, national statistics on proﬁts at the ﬁrm or sectoral levels are not available. In
order to get around this data constraint, we constructed a riskiness indicator based on data from
Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) from which we gathered comparable ﬁnancial and business information
on nearly 3 million ﬁrms from the EU-15 countries over 9 years (2004-2012).21
We assume that the distribution of sectors among the diﬀerent levels of riskiness is the same
in EU-15 and Switzerland. Our deﬁnition of sector riskiness is directly inspired on theoretical
models where proﬁt variability is the main reason to preferring a progressive tax schedule rather
than a proportional one, e.g. Bacher and Brülhart (2013). The standard deviation of proﬁts
within sectors represents our riskiness index.
Ideally we would have used a time-variant measure of riskiness. However, given that the data
on proﬁts are available just for 2 of the 8 years of our panel, we decided to use the time-average
21EU-15 area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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of the standard deviation of proﬁts within sectors.
3.5.3 Results
Baseline results
Our baseline results are shown in Table 3.5.22 Column (1), the simplest speciﬁcation, where
only municipal and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included, shows a positive eﬀect of the ﬂat tax dummy
on the number of ﬁrms. Column (2) and (3) where we add our set of controls, are in line with
the existence of the insurance eﬀect i.e., the coeﬃcient of the ﬂat-tax dummy is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the results for corporate tax conﬁrm what we already found
in section 3.4.2. It is worth noticing that once again our instrument performs well.
A ﬂat-tax reform signiﬁcantly reduces the number of ﬁrms in a given municipality. In terms
of magnitude, the coeﬃcient of the ﬂat-tax dummy in our preferred speciﬁcation, column (3),
suggests that by switching from a progressive to a proportional tax schedule would decrease the
number of ﬁrms by roughly 12%. Considering an average municipality, in our sample, this kind
of reform would translate in a reduction of roughly 18 ﬁrms.
This result fosters the idea that the positive eﬀect given by the simplicity of a ﬂat-tax schedule
is actually more than oﬀset by the negative eﬀect arising through a reduction in progressivity.
Robustness checks
In Table 3.6 we assess whether there exist sectoral heterogeneities in the eﬀect described before
by mainly focusing on diﬀerent sub-sample of ﬁrms. Whereas in column (1) we present, again,
our preferred speciﬁcation (column (3) of Table 3.5), columns (2) and (3) show the estimations
in which the dependent variable accounts for, respectively, low or high risk sectors as deﬁned
in section 3.5.2. In column (2) we use a sub-sample that only includes ﬁrms belonging to those
sectors from the lower-half of the riskiness distribution (low-risk sectors). Similarly, in column (3)
we only include ﬁrms belonging to those sectors from the upper-half of the riskiness distribution
(high-risk sectors). Although the coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant in both estimations (i.e.,
−0.089 for low-risk and −0.138 for high-risk sectors, respectively) their magnitude is diﬀerent
and, thus, so it is the size of the impact on ﬁrms' location choices. In other words, the ﬂat-tax
reform reduces by 8.9% the number of ﬁrms on low risk sectors and by 13.8% on high risk sectors.
Thus, the negative impact is 55% stronger for high-risk sectors compared to low-risk ones.
22We use errors clustered at the municipal level for the same arguments described in section 3.4.1.
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Table 3.5: The eﬀect of a ﬂat tax rate on the number of ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3)
Flat tax dummy 0.159*** -0.094*** -0.124***
(0.055) (0.032) (0.041)
Corporate tax rate -0.087*** 0.108** 0.153**
(0.034) (0.048) (0.061)
Corporate tax rate2 0.002*** -0.002** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Inactive and unemployed -0.003
(0.003)
Population in 1,000 0.036**
(0.015)
% Young (≤ 15) 0.000
(0.002)
% Old (≥ 65) -0.000
(0.002)
% Foreigners -0.001
(0.002)
% German speaking population -0.007***
(0.003)
% Left votes in national ballots 0.002*
(0.001)
Personal income tax rate -0.019**
(0.009)
% Protestant population -0.005***
(0.002)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend No Yes Yes
RMSE 0.198 0.192 0.203
Weak instrument test (F- stat) 31.071 24.085 16.878
N. Observations 11646 11646 11646
N. Municipalities 1689 1689 1689
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. The dependent variable is Log( total number of ﬁrms). Corporate tax
rate is instrumented by the average values of the % of left votes on national election for
all municipalities within a radius of 15 km of a given municipality. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05
and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6: The eﬀect of a ﬂat tax rate on the number of ﬁrms (sectorial risk)
Std. Deviation Proﬁt
Baseline Low High
(1) (2) (3)
Flat tax dummy -0.124*** -0.089* -0.138**
(0.041) (0.053) (0.056)
Corporate tax rate 0.153** 0.136* 0.175**
(0.061) (0.081) (0.087)
Corporate tax rate 2 -0.003** -0.003* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
% Inactive and unemployed -0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population in 1,000 0.036** 0.024** 0.041**
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017)
% Young (≤ 15) 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Old (≥ 65) -0.000 -0.006** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
% Foreigners -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% German speaking population -0.007*** -0.006** -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Left votes in national ballots 0.002* 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Personal income tax rate -0.019** -0.013 -0.026**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
% Protestant population -0.005*** -0.001 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend Yes Yes Yes
RMSE 0.203 0.235 0.247
Weak instrument test (F- stat) 16.878 16.589 17.173
N. Observations 11646 11542 11536
N. Municipalities 1689 1684 1683
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. The dependent variable is Log(total number of ﬁrms) in column (1),
Log (number of ﬁrms from low risk sectors) in column (3) and Log (number of ﬁrms from
high risk sectors) in column (4). Corporate tax rate is instrumented by the average values
of the % of left votes on national election for all municipalities within a radius of 15 km of
a given municipality. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper assesses the eﬀect of both the level of corporate taxes (tax level eﬀect) and of the
introduction of a ﬂat-tax reform (ﬂat-tax eﬀect) on ﬁrms' location choices by using a newly
assembled database of nearly 1, 700 Swiss municipalities for 8 years over the period 1985-2008.
Unlike most of previous empirical papers and traditional tax competition models that suggest
a negative impact of tax rates, we ﬁnd a positive, small (but statistically signiﬁcant) and robust
tax level eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms. We are aware that this result could be controversial
because it contradicts the common wisdom in tax competition literature suggesting a race to
the bottom where competing jurisdictions would reduce local tax rates in order to attract ﬁrms.
Nevertheless, we think that this is an interesting result form an economic point of view. Taking
for granted that ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers, an entrepreneur could see taxes as a way of getting
access to more and/or better infrastructure or human capital in a particular jurisdiction. If the
marginal cost of an additional percentage point in taxes is more than oﬀset by the marginal ben-
eﬁts received, for instance, by the public goods oﬀered by a given municipality; the entrepreneur
would be better oﬀ and, thus, would decide to settle in such a municipality. Interestingly, we
ﬁnd that the tax level eﬀect is positive up to a certain threshold. Indeed, our results suggest
that (on average) over 28.3%, the eﬀect of increasing the tax rate turns negative. In other words,
over this threshold increasing tax rates starts being unappealing for ﬁrms.
The second channel through which taxes aﬀect ﬁrms' location decision, the ﬂat-tax eﬀect,
is less straightforward than the former. The intuition behind this eﬀect is mainly based on
the characteristics of the tax law. Tax progressivity, for instance, should encourage risk-taking
entrepreneurial activities i.e., tax insurance eﬀect. Indeed, by keeping the expected after-tax
proﬁt constant, tax progressivity should act as an insurance device because it reduces the variance
of proﬁts by more than linear taxation. On the other hand, a simpler tax schedule (such a the
ﬂat-tax one) should have a positive impact on ﬁrms' location choices. Thus, the ﬁnal eﬀect of a
ﬂat-tax reform is an empirical matter and depends on which of these two opposite eﬀects prevail.
Our results show a negative overall impact of our ﬂat-tax dummy conﬁrming the presence of the
insurance eﬀect. Indeed, even if we are not able to estimate the magnitude of these two opposite
eﬀects individually, our results suggest that the insurance eﬀect more than oﬀsets the positive
impact given by the simplicity of the ﬂat-tax schedule. On average, switching from a progressive
to a ﬂat-tax schedule decreases the number of ﬁrms by roughly 12%. We also verify that this
eﬀect is larger (i.e., more negative) for ﬁrms belonging to riskier sectors. Finally, we are aware
of the limitations of our identiﬁcation strategy, mainly because of data constraints. Indeed, we
believe that further research is required in order to draw stronger and more robust conclusions
regarding the insurance eﬀect.
77
3.A Appendix
Table 3.A.1: First stage regressions of Table 3.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% of left votes -0.054*** -0.155*** -0.149*** -0.361*** -20.880*** -0.279*** -16.656*** -0.295*** -17.262***
neighbouring municipalities (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.052) (2.104) (0.047) (1.845) (0.048) (1.879)
% of left votes 0.007*** 0.394*** 0.003*** 0.239*** 0.004*** 0.259***
neighbouring municipalities2 (0.001) (0.046) (0.001) (0.038) (0.001) (0.039)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.163 0.599 0.626 0.169 0.147 0.600 0.544 0.627 0.574
N. Observations 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646
N. Municipalities 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is Corporate tax rate in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8
and Corporate tax rate squared in column 5, 7 and 9. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.A.2: First stage regressions of Table 3.4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
% of left votes -0.295*** -17.262*** -0.297*** -17.260*** -0.295*** -17.303*** -0.299*** -17.591*** -0.294*** -17.249***
neighbouring municipalities (0.048) (1.879) (0.048) (1.877) (0.048) (1.888) (0.049) (1.914) (0.048) (1.880)
% of left votes 0.004*** 0.259*** 0.004*** 0.259*** 0.003*** 0.259*** 0.004*** 0.266*** 0.003*** 0.259***
neighbouring municipalities2 (0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.040) (0.001) (0.039)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.627 0.574 0.627 0.574 0.628 0.574 0.627 0.571 0.627 0.574
N. Observations 11646 11646 11443 11443 11575 11575 11250 11250 11624 11624
N. Municipalities 1689 1689 1682 1682 1687 1687 1658 1658 1688 1688
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is Corporate tax rate in columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, and Corporate
tax rate squared in column 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A.3: First stage regressions of Table 3.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% of left votes -0.616*** -27.862*** -0.350*** -18.654*** -0.363*** -19.162***
neighbouring municipalities (0.060) (2.375) (0.050) (1.947) (0.050) (1.954)
% of left votes 0.013*** 0.532*** 0.005*** 0.294*** 0.005*** 0.312***
neighbouring municipalities2 (0.001) (0.051) (0.001) (0.040) (0.001) (0.041)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control variables No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.313 0.248 0.614 0.554 0.640 0.583
N. Observations 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646
N. Municipalities 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is
Corporate tax rate in columns 1, 3, and 5 and Corporate tax rate squared in column 2, 4 and 6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.A.4: First stage regressions of Table 3.6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% of left votes -0.363*** -19.162*** -0.361*** -19.108*** -0.363*** -19.159***
neighbouring municipalities (0.050) (1.954) (0.050) (1.959) (0.050) (1.958)
% of left votes 0.005*** 0.312*** 0.005*** 0.313*** 0.005*** 0.311***
neighbouring municipalities2 (0.001) (0.041) (0.001) (0.041) (0.001) (0.041)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton x time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.640 0.583 0.642 0.587 0.639 0.581
N. Observations 11646 11646 11542 11542 11536 11536
N. Municipalities 1689 1689 1684 1684 1683 1683
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. In all columns standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is
Corporate tax rate in columns 1, 3, and 5 and Corporate tax rate squared in column 2, 4 and 6. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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